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ABSTRACT

We present field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers’ skills distorts both firm and
workseeker behavior. Assessing workseekers’ skills, giving workseekers their assessment results, and helping them
to credibly share the results with firms increases workseekers’ employment and earnings. It also aligns their beliefs
and search strategies more closely with their skills. Giving assessment results only to workseekers has similar effects
on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms
increases callbacks. These patterns are consistent with two-sided information frictions, a new finding that can inform
design of information-provision mechanisms.
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Introduction

Workseekers make job search decisions and firms make hiring decisions using potentially limited information about workseekers’ skills. Limited information for firms can lead to hiring poorly-matched
workers and to wedges between wage offers and productivity (Altonji and Pierret, 2001; Arcidiacono
et al., 2010; Farber and Gibbons, 1996; Kahn and Lange, 2014). These hiring distortions can reduce
both employment and average wages conditional on employment (Aigner and Cain, 1977; Pallais,
2014). Limited information for workseekers can lead them to search for jobs that poorly match
their skills or withdraw from search entirely (Belot et al., 2018; Conlon et al., 2018). These search
distortions can also lead to lower employment and lower wages conditional on employment. When
both sides of the market receive credible information on workseekers’ skills or past performance,
these workseekers’ outcomes in the labor market can improve (Abebe et al., 2020a; Abel, 2019; Bassi
and Nansamba, 2020; Pallais, 2014). These information problems may be particularly important in
settings where hiring is less formal and education provides less information about skills (Pritchett,
2013). Limited information may exacerbate other frictions in developing country labor markets,
such as high search and migration costs (Abebe et al., 2020b; Bryan et al., 2014; Franklin, 2017).
We study how providing new information about workseekers’ skills affects job search and hiring decisions and workseekers’ labor market outcomes. We run a series of field experiments that
separately manipulate firms’ and workseekers’ information about workseekers’ skills. We provide
the first evidence that both firms and workseekers adjust their behavior when they acquire new
information about workseekers’ skills, improving workseekers’ outcomes in the labor market. The
existence of two-sided information frictions is important both conceptually and for the design of
information-provision products and policies.1 Many existing policies target only one-sided frictions
and may have limited returns if two-sided frictions are present. For example, firms testing job
applicants’ skills has limited returns if well-matched workseekers do not apply to these firms, while
workseeker skill assessments offered in job search assistance programs have limited returns if workseekers cannot credibly communicate their skills to firms. Existing papers cannot identify two-sided
information frictions because they study only one side of the market or study simultaneous two-sided
information revelation.
We study firms’ and workseekers’ responses to learning workseekers’ results on standardized skill
assessments. The assessments measure non-specialist skills such as communication, numeracy, and
grit and draw on existing tools used by job placement agencies and large firms. The 6,891 assessed
workseekers are drawn from a population where information frictions may be important. They
are unemployed or underemployed black youths in urban South Africa with limited post-secondary
education, work experience, and access to referral networks. This population faces statistical dis1

We use the term ‘information friction’ to refer to distortions in behavior due to limited information about workseekers’ skills. Our experiments do not speak to limited information about other factors such as vacancy characteristics
or workers’ effort.
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crimination in this labor market (Malindi, 2017).
We demonstrate the existence of two-sided information frictions in three steps. First, we show
that giving workseekers their results from these assessments and enabling them to easily and credibly
share the results with firms improves the workseekers’ labor market outcomes. To show this, we
randomly select some workseekers for a ‘public’ certification intervention. We give them electronic
and physical certificates describing the assessments and showing their results. The certificates show
their names and national identity numbers and are branded by the widely known agency that
conducts the assessments and the World Bank. We compare these workseekers to a control group of
workseekers who receive no certificates and do not learn their results. In the three to four months
following certification, publicly certified workseekers use certificates in job applications, shift their
beliefs about their skills closer to their assessment results, and target their search toward jobs that
they think value their skills. Their employment rate increases by 17% (5 percentage points), weekly
earnings increase by 34%, and hourly wages increase by 20% relative to the control group. The rise
in earnings reflects both higher employment and higher earnings conditional on employment.
This first step shows that information frictions exist, but does not show who has limited information about workseekers’ skills. The treatment effects are consistent with firms changing hiring
and wage offer decisions as they learn about workseekers’ skills from seeing certificates, with workseekers changing search behavior as they learn their own assessment results, or with both types of
frictions.
In the second step of our argument, we show that workseekers face information frictions. We
randomly select some assessed workseekers for a ‘private’ certification intervention. This intervention gives them one physical certificate that shows their assessment results and describes the
assessments, but excludes identifying information and branding that might make the certificate a
credible source of information to firms. Private certification has the same effects as public certification on workseekers’ beliefs and search targeting, a positive effect on earnings that is smaller
than the public certification effect, and no effect on employment. These results show that giving
workseekers more information about their skills changes their behavior and outcomes in the labor
market. However, effects are smaller than when they can also share the information with firms. This
pattern is consistent with both sides of the market having limited information about workseekers’
skills, but inconsistent with only one side having limited information.
In the third step of our argument, we run an audit/correspondence experiment as a further
check for firm-side information frictions. This experiment manipulates firms’ information without
scope for changes in workseeker behavior. We submit applications to real job vacancies using real
resumes from workseekers in our sample. We submit multiple applications per vacancy, randomizing
whether applications include public certificates. Applications including certificates get 11% more
interview invitations, consistent with firms having limited information about workseekers’ skills and
acquiring more information from skill certification.
3

These three experiments demonstrate our main finding: both firms and workseekers have limited information about workseekers’ skills. In addition, we present four secondary findings that
further characterise how information frictions affect this labor market using heterogeneity analysis
and smaller experiments. First, learning specific assessment results is important, not just learning
that workseekers have been assessed. The certification effects are not driven, for example, by firms
using workseekers’ decisions to get assessed as a signal for tenacity or proactivity, or by firms basing
hiring decisions purely on the certificates’ branding. Second, in this context, preferences for different
skills vary across firms and relative performance in different assessments varies across workseekers.
This pattern is more consistent with horizontal than vertical differentiation: certification helps firms
identify which workseekers are suited for specific jobs, rather than identify a subset of workseekers
suited for all jobs.2 Third, certification has larger effects on the labor market outcomes of workseekers who lack other ways to communicate their skills to employers, like work experience and
university education. Fourth, although we do not directly observe if certified workseekers become
employed at the expense of workseekers outside our sample, most of our results are consistent with
economic mechanisms in which certification can increase total employment.
Our primary contribution is to show that both firms and workseekers face information frictions
and that both sides of the labor market respond to information provision. This extends existing work
documenting labour market patterns consistent with either firm-side or workseeker-side information
frictions in both developed and developing economies.3 We build on this work by showing that both
firms and workseekers face limited information about workseekers’ skills. Our work is most similar
to papers that study information frictions by simultaneously revealing information to both firms
and workseekers about skill assessment results (Abebe et al., 2020a; Bassi and Nansamba, 2020) or
evaluations from workseekers’ past employers (Abel et al., 2020; Pallais, 2014). These papers show
that information revelation changes workseekers’ outcomes and interpret this as evidence of firm-side
information frictions. But they do not separately manipulate firms’ and workseekers’ information,
so cannot distinguish one-sided from two-sided frictions.4
The distinction between one- and two-sided frictions is important for designing mechanisms
that private actors or government can use to address information frictions. Interventions targeted
at one side of the market are common, but may not be optimal if both sides of the market face
2
This finding is consistent with recent work on information frictions in matching models with multidimensional
skills (Fredriksson et al., 2018; Guvenen et al., 2020; Lise and Postel-Vinay, 2020).
3
Altonji and Pierret (2001), Arcidiacono et al. (2010), Farber and Gibbons (1996), and Kahn and Lange (2014)
show that wages align more closely with skills as tenure increases, consistent with limited information about skills
at the time of hiring. Wage and retention patterns for workers hired through referrals are also consistent with
information frictions (Ioannides and Loury, 2004; Heath, 2018) and some researchers find that workers have better
labor market outcomes when they have formal educational qualifications, conditional on measured skills (Alfonsi
et al., 2017; MacLeod et al., 2017). Workseekers’ job search decisions can change when workseekers learn more about
their labor market prospects (Ahn et al., 2019; Altmann et al., 2018; Belot et al., 2018), although these papers do
not specifically examine limited information about workseekers’ skills.
4
Abel et al. (2020) reveal information to both sides of the market and only to firms, but do not test for workseekerside frictions.
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frictions. On the workseeker side, some job search assistance programs offer skill assessments to
workseekers (McCall et al., 2016). This can inform workseekers and improve their search targeting.
But if firms face information frictions and do not learn these assessment results, then firms’ hiring
choices and wage offers will remain distorted and workseekers’ improved search will have limited
returns. On the firm side, skill assessments are sometimes used to inform firm hiring decisions
(Autor and Scarborough, 2008; Hoffman et al., 2018). But if workseekers face information frictions,
they might not apply for jobs that match their skills, leaving firms to assess and select from a
sub-optimal pool of applicants. Two-sided frictions may reduce the return to one-sided information
acquisition enough to deter investment in one-sided screening by firms or signalling by workseekers.
Alonso (2018) shows that introducing one-sided information acquisition in labor market matching
can reduce welfare when information frictions are two-sided.
This paper complements work on the aggregate implications of information frictions. Canonical
models show that search and matching frictions facing individual workseekers and firms can generate
aggregate unemployment (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). Our finding of two-sided information
frictions offers an experimental foundation for general equilibrium models in which both firms and
workseekers have limited information about match productivity, leading to aggregate employment
distortions (Jovanovic, 1979; Menzio and Shi, 2011). In particular, our findings complement work
by Donovan et al. (2018), who show that models with limited information about workseekers’ skills
can explain aggregate labor market dynamics in developing countries.
Our findings on information frictions are also relevant to the design of active labor market
programs (ALMPs). We show that a skill assessment and certification intervention, delivered during
recruitment for an ALMP, can substantially and cheaply improve participants’ employment and
earnings. The employment effect is almost three times larger than the mean effect size of the active
labor market programs reviewed by Card et al. (2018). The average earnings gain in the first
three months after treatment is 5.6 times the average variable cost of this certification intervention
alone and 2.3 times the average variable cost of assessment and certification.5 Skill assessment
and certification may enhance the value of ALMPs to participating workseekers even when other
mechanisms for learning about workseekers’ skills exist. Importantly, certification is available to
first-time workseekers, unlike reference letters or performance evaluations from past employers.
Assessment results can be certified to multiple employers, while workplace performance at one
employer may be imperfectly observed by other employers (Kahn, 2013). Certification can help
workseekers excluded from referral networks or firms who receive referrals based on factors poorly
aligned with workseekers’ skills (Beaman and Magruder, 2012; Beaman et al., 2018; Chandrasekhar
et al., 2020).
We describe the economic environment in Section 2: a simple conceptual framework, the con5

In a similar spirit, several papers show that making low-cost changes to ALMPs so they provide more information
to firms and/or workseekers improves their effectiveness (Abel et al., 2020; Belot et al., 2018; Wheeler et al., 2019).
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text, the sample, and the skill assessments. In Section 3, we describe the public skill certification
experiment and the treatment effects on workseekers’ labor market outcomes. In Section 4, we analyze the roles of firm- and workseeker-side frictions. In Section 5, we discuss secondary results about
what workseekers and firms learn from certification, what this implies for the effects of certification
on different types of workseekers, and what this might imply for certification at a larger scale. We
conclude in Section 6 and discuss questions around markets for assessment-based certification.

2

Economic Environment

2.1

Conceptual Framework

In this section, we sketch a simple conceptual framework with two goals. First, the framework
illustrates how either workseeker- or firm-side information frictions can lower two labor market outcomes: the employment rate and the mean wage conditional on employment. Hence, observing
that employment and/or wages rise when both firms and workseekers acquire more information
does not show which side(s) of the market face information frictions. This highlights the importance of the separate variation we generate in firms’ and workseekers’ information sets. Second,
the framework illustrates the mechanisms that link limited information to distortions in firm and
workseeker behavior and hence to lower wages and employment. This guides our empirical tests of
these mechanisms.
Consider a stylized economy consisting of infinitely many type W1 and W2 workseekers and
type J1 and J2 jobs. Workseekers choose not to search, to search for type 1 jobs, or to search
for type 2 jobs. Searching for either type of job incurs fixed cost C > 0. A type i workseeker
searching for type j jobs meets a firm offering such a job with probability Pi,j . Conditional on
meeting, the match produces output with pecuniary value Vi,j and pays wage Wi,j ≤ Vi,j . The
workseeker receives utility U (Pi,j · Wi,j ) − C if she searches and zero otherwise, implying that she
has a reservation wage W i (C, P ).6 Non-employment is possible if search costs are high relative to
the expected utility of working (which leads to some non-participation) or if the meeting probability
Pi,j is less than one for some (i, j).
We make some additional simplifying assumptions for this discussion, but none of the results
in the framework depend on these additional assumptions. First, we assume fraction p of all workseekers and all jobs are type 1. Second, we assume that type i workseekers are better at searching
for type i jobs, produce the most output in type i jobs, and earn the highest wages in type i jobs,
and similarly for type j workseekers and type j jobs. Under these assumptions, if type i workseekers
choose to search, they will choose to search for type i jobs rather than type j jobs, and vice versa.
Limited information about workseekers’ skills can enter this environment in two ways. First, we
consider the case where only workseekers observe their types with error. This type of friction can
6

For simplicity, we assume that firms post and commit to wages before workseekers make search decisions. This
implies that all workseekers who choose to search for type j jobs will accept them if offered.
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occur if, for example, workseekers receive limited information about their own type from education
or work experience or if they have little education or work experience. With this type of friction, each
workseeker chooses whether and where to search based on her perceived type. If a type i workseeker
‘incorrectly’ searches for a type j 6= i job, she is less likely to meet a firm and, conditional on
meeting a firm, will produce less and earn a lower wage. This type of friction reduces mean wages
conditional on employment by generating some mismatches between workseeker and job types.
This can also reduce the employment rate through two mechanisms: workseekers who search for the
wrong type of jobs are less likely to meet firms, and mismatches between workseeker and job types
may not generate enough output to offer wages above the reservation wage. The former mechanism
can occur if, for example, if firms offering different types of jobs hire using different channels, like
posting formal adverts versus hiring walk-ins. The latter mechanism can occur if, for example,
search costs and hence reservation wages are high or if there is a legal minimum wage. Belot et al.
(2018) and Falk et al. (2006) prove results of this flavor formally.
Second, only firms may observe workseekers’ types with error. This type of friction can occur
if attributes observable to firms, like educational qualifications or past work experience, provide
limited information about skills. With this type of friction, workseekers search for the ‘right’ types
of jobs but firms do not know the type of the workseekers they meet. If type j firms believe that
fraction q of the workseekers they meet are type j, then the expected output from each hire is
q · Vj,j + (1 − q) · Vi,j . If firms’ utility is a concave function of their output, then they will offer a
wage lower than q · Wj,j + (1 − q) · Wi,j . Concavity can arise from firms’ production technology or
from uninsured risks from bad hires. Possible uninsured risks include lost customers or damaged
equipment from hiring the ‘wrong’ workseekers or severance pay and dispute resolution costs when
firing workseekers. This reduces mean wages conditional on employment and, if the offered wage
is below the reservation wage or minimum wage, reduces the employment rate. Aigner and Cain
(1977) and Pallais (2014) prove results of this flavor formally.
This simple framework shows that observing a rise in employment and/or wages when both
firms and workseekers acquire more information does not show which side(s) of the market face
information frictions. This highlights the importance of the separate variation we generate in firms’
and workseekers’ information sets. Depending on the structure of the model, frictions on both sides
of the market might interact to generate larger distortions or partly offset each other. We do not
explore this in detail because our experimental design does not identify the size of any interaction
effect without additional assumptions. We focus on the static case for simplicity, but recognize
that the effect of information frictions may differ in a dynamic framework with learning by firms or
workseekers (Conlon et al., 2018; Lange, 2007).
The framework allows either horizontal or vertical differentiation of workseekers. We define
horizontal differentiation as type i workseekers being more productive than type j workseekers in
type i jobs and vice versa. We define vertical differentiation as type i workseekers being more
7

productive than type j workseekers in all jobs. In both cases, either firm- or workseeker-side
information frictions can lower the employment rate and the mean wage conditional on employment.
With horizontal differentiation, frictions on either side of the market can lower wages conditional on
employment for all types of workseekers. With vertical differentiation, firm-side frictions can lower
wages for type i workseekers mistaken for type j workseekers and raise wages for type j workseekers
if they are mistaken for type i workseekers.
2.2

Context

We work in the metropolitan area of Johannesburg, South Africa’s commercial and industrial hub.
Johannesburg’s labor market has four salient features for our study. First, information frictions
are likely, as alternative sources of information on workseekers’ skills are limited. Many young
workseekers have no work experience several years after completing education, limiting the scope
to learn about or signal their skills through experience (Ingle and Mlatsheni, 2017). Grades and
grade progression in most primary and secondary schools are weakly correlated with independently
measured skills (Lam et al., 2011; Taylor et al., 2011). Workseekers who have completed secondary
school typically report their grades in the nationally standardized graduation exam in job applications. But examination grades weakly predict performance in post-secondary education and firms
report in interviews that the grades convey limited information about skills (Schöer et al., 2010).7
This limits the scope for firms and workseekers to learn about workseekers’ skills from their educational attainment. Certification is thus likely to provide both firms and workseekers with additional
information on workseekers’ skills.
Second, ‘wrong’ hires are costly to firms. Firing a worker requires a complex and lengthy
process and can be challenged by even temporary employees in courts and specialized dispute
resolution bodies.8 Probationary work is permitted but regulated and probation periods cannot
exceed three months (Bhorat and Cheadle, 2009). Firms report challenges understanding labor
regulation, contributing to the perceived cost of separations.9 Consistent with these factors, giving
firms free consulting on labor regulation increases hiring (Bertrand and Crépon, 2019).
Third, reservation and minimum wages exist. Minimum wage compliance in the formal sector is
high (Bhorat et al., 2016; International Labour Organization, 2016). Commuting costs are high and
likely to raise reservation wages (Kerr, 2017). The nearly universal state pension system gives workseekers in multi-generation households access to non-labor market income, increasing reservation
wages (Abel, 2019).
7

The limited information content of education qualifications is consistent with the large role of referrals in hiring:
more than half of all firms report that referrals are their preferred recruitment mechanism (Schöer et al., 2014).
8
Small firms report an average of two dispute resolution cases in the previous year, requiring an average of 11
days of staff time per case (Rankin et al., 2012).
9
Only 18% of SME owners know the conditions that made a contract valid or rules governing severance pay
(Bertrand and Crépon, 2019).
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Fourth, employment rates are low. In our study period, unemployment in Johannesburg was
28% for the working-age population, 51% for ages 15-24, and 32% for ages 25-34 (Statistics South
Africa, 2016).10 Low employment in the presence of information frictions, costs from ‘wrong’ hires,
and reservation or minimum wages are consistent with our conceptual framework. Particularly low
employment for youths is also consistent with information frictions, as youths have less search and
work experience to reveal their types. Many other factors can contribute to low employment rates;
we merely argue that a role for information frictions is plausible.
2.3

Sample Recruitment and Data Collection

We recruit a sample of 6,891 young, active workseekers from low-income backgrounds with limited
work experience. Workseekers in our sample have limited access to traditional ways to learn about
their skills and communicate their skills to prospective employers: university education, work experience, or access to referral networks. We recruit only active workseekers, so we do not examine
the relationship between information frictions and labor market participation decisions. This is a
sample from a policy- and theory-relevant population likely to face information frictions, rather
than a population-representative sample.
To recruit the sample, we work with the Harambee Youth Employment Accelerator, a social
enterprise that assesses the skills of inexperienced workseekers and matches them to employers
looking for entry-level workseekers, amongst other activities. Harambee recruits candidates through
radio and social media advertising and door-to-door recruitment in low-income neighborhoods.
Interested candidates register online and complete a phone-based screening questionnaire.11 Eligible
candidates are invited to two days of standardized skill assessments. Some candidates are invited
to further job readiness training based on their assessment results and residential location, but
only 0.2% of candidates in our sample get jobs through this training. Our sample consists of all
candidates who arrive at Harambee for the second of these two testing days, on 84 operational
days.
We conduct three surveys to measure workseekers’ labor market outcomes, job search, and beliefs
about their skills and the labor market. The baseline is a self-administered questionnaire that
candidates complete on desktop computers at Harambee under supervision. This is administered
after candidates have done skills assessments but before they receive information about their results.
We collect endline data in a 25-minute phone survey 3-4 months after treatment.12 The phone survey
10

Throughout the paper, we use Statistics South Africa’s definition of an employed person as someone who did
any income-generating activity, for at least one hour, during the reference week. Unemployment rates exclude those
in full-time education or not in the labor force.
11
Candidates are eligible to work with Harambee if they are aged 18-29, have legal permission to work in South
Africa, have completed secondary school, have at most twelve months of formal work experience, have no criminal
record, and are from disadvantaged backgrounds. This information is self-reported but checked against administrative
data for some candidates.
12
See Garlick et al. (2019) for an experimental validation of labor market data from phone surveys in this setting.
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response rate is 96%, leaving an endline sample of 6,607 respondents. The response rate is balanced
across treatment groups (Table D.5) and unrelated to most baseline covariates (Table D.6). We also
conduct a short text message survey 2-3 days after treatment. Respondents receive mobile phone
airtime payments for answering the text message and phone surveys.
2.4

Job Search and Employment in The Sample

This section describes relevant patterns around labor market outcomes and job search in our sample.
We report summary statistics for key baseline and endline variables for the 6,891 workseekers in
Tables D.1 and D.2. Respondents are 99% Black African, 62% female, and on average 24 years
old. 17% have a university degree or diploma, 21% have some other post-secondary certificate,
and 99% have completed secondary school. Malindi (2017) shows that young, black workseekers
with relatively low levels of education face discrimination in this labor market, with wage dynamics
consistent with information frictions and statistical discrimination.
38% of the sample worked in the week before the baseline and 70% had ever worked, but only 9%
had ever held a long-term job. Conditional on working, mean weekly earnings in the week before the
baseline was 565 South African Rands (94 USD in purchasing power parity terms), slightly below
the minimum wage for a full-time worker in most sectors. Wage work was eight times more common
than self-employment. Most work was relatively short-term, with median and mean tenures of 2
and 7 months respectively.
97% of the sample searched for work in the week before the baseline. In that week, they spent
on average 17 hours and 242 South African Rands (40 USD PPP) searching. The relatively high
search costs suggest that welfare gains for workseekers are possible from improved search targeting.
Workseekers submitted on average 10 applications in the preceding month and received 1.2 offers,
though the medians for both measures are zero. The job search and application process is somewhat
formal: 38% of the candidates employed at endline reported that they submitted written applications
for their current job and 47% reported that they had a formal interview.
2.5

Assessments

We conduct six assessments with workseekers: communication, concept formation (similar to a
Raven’s test), focus, grit, numeracy, and planning. Firms have demonstrated interest in the results
of these assessments, though they obviously also use other information in hiring decisions. Client
firms have paid Harambee to screen roughly 160,000 prospective workers using these assessments.
Appendix A describes each assessment in detail, their psychometric properties, and how some
Harambee client firms use them in hiring.
Each assessment session is led by two or three industrial psychologists, who manage a team of
facilitators. Assessments are conducted in English and are self-administered on desktop computers.
Appendix Table D.1 shows standardized scores on all six assessments. There is a fairly even spread
10

of candidates over the distribution and little evidence of ceiling effects.
Appendix Table A.2 shows the correlation matrix between different skills. We interpret candidates with different assessment results as different worker types, in the language of the conceptual
framework. Scores are weakly correlated across assessments, with pairwise correlations between 0.05
and 0.51. Hence, the assessments horizontally differentiate candidates based on their relative skills
rather than only ranking them in a single dimension of skills.
Candidates have inaccurate beliefs about their own types, suggesting a role for workseeker-side
information frictions. We ask candidates in which tercile they believe they ranked for each of the
communication, concept formation, and numeracy assessments, after taking the assessments but
before any candidates learn their results. Only 8% of candidates answer correctly for all three
assessments and 28% of candidates answer incorrectly for all three assessments. Overconfidence
is more common than underconfidence: 22% of candidates overestimate their tercile on all three
assessments and 1% underestimate their tercile all three assessments (Appendix Table D.1).

3

Labor Market Effects of Certification

3.1

Intervention

Our first certification intervention gives candidates information about their assessment results and
allows them to share the results with prospective employers. The effects of this intervention may
reflect reductions in firm- or workseeker-side information frictions. In either case, the framework
predicts that certified workseekers will have higher employment and higher earnings conditional on
employment.
Candidates receive a certificate describing the assessments and their performance (Figure 1).
They receive 20 color copies printed on high-quality paper and an email version. Each certificate
briefly describes Harambee and its placement and assessment work. To provide credibility to the
assessments and results, the certificate is branded with the World Bank logo and Harambee logo.
Harambee is a widely recognized brand in South African marketing surveys (Mackay, 2014).
The certificate describes the skills measured by each assessment. The certificate directs the
reader to www.assessmentreport.info for more information on Harambee and the assessments. The
website shows sample questions for each assessment and describes how psychologists have designed
and evaluated the assessments. For each skill, the certificate shows the tercile in which the candidate ranked on each assessment, compared to other candidates assessed by Harambee.13 The
candidates assessed by Harambee are described as South African high school graduates aged 18-34
from disadvantaged backgrounds. To link candidates with certificates, each certificate shows the
candidate’s name and national identity number. National identity numbers are typically shown on
resumes and school transcripts in South Africa.
13

In piloting, both workseekers and firms found certificates with only rankings easier to interpret than certificates
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Figure 1: Sample Public Certificate

REPORT ON CANDIDATE COMPETENCIES
name.. surname..
ID No. id..
This report provides information on assessments conducted by Harambee Youth Employment Accelerator (harambee.co.za), a South
African organisation that connects employers looking for entry-level talent to young, high-potential work-seekers with a matric or
equivalent. Harambee has conducted more than 1 million assessments and placed candidates with over 250 top companies in retail,
hospitality, financial services and other sectors. Assessments are designed by psychologists and predict candidates’ productivity and
success in the workplace. This report was designed and funded in collaboration with the World Bank. You can find more information
about this report, the assessments and contact details at www.assessmentreport.info. «name» was assessed at Harambee on 13
September, 2016.
«name» completed assessments on English Communication (listening, reading, comprehension), Numeracy, and Concept Formation:
1. The Numeracy tests measure candidates’ ability to apply numerical concepts at a National Qualifications Framework (NQF) level,
such as working with fractions, ratios, money, percentages and units, and performing calculations with time and area. This score is
an average of two numeracy tests the candidate completed.
2. The Communication test measures a candidate's grasp of the English language through listening, reading and comprehension. It
assesses at an NQF level, for example measuring the ability to recognise and recall literal and non-literal text.
3. The Concept Formation Test is a non-verbal measure that evaluates candidates’ ability to understand and solve problems. Those
with high scores are generally able to solve complex problems, while lower scores indicate an ability to solve less complex
problems.
«name» also completed tasks and questionnaires to assess their soft skills:
4. The Planning Ability Test measures how candidates plan their actions in multi-step problems. Candidates with high scores generally plan one or more steps ahead in solving complex problems.
5. The Focus Test assesses a candidate’s ability to distinguish relevant from irrelevant information in potentially confusing
environments. Candidates with high scores are generally able to focus on tasks in distracting surroundings, while candidates with
lower scores are more easily distracted by irrelevant information.
6. The Grit Scale measures whether candidates show determination when working on challenging problems. Those with high scores
generally spend more time working on challenging problems, while those with low scores choose to pursue different problems.
«name»’s results have been compared to a large benchmark group of young (age 18-34) South Africans assessed by Harambee.
All candidates have a matric certificate and are from socially disadvantaged backgrounds. The benchmark group is 5,000 for
cognitive skills and 400 for soft skills.
«name» scored in the «tercile_num» THIRD of candidates assessed by Harambee for Numeracy, «tercile_lit» THIRD for
Communication, «tercile_cft» THIRD for Concept Formation, «tercile_tol» THIRD for Planning Ability, «tercile_troop»
THIRD for Focus and «tercile_grit» THIRD for the Grit Scale.

DISCLAIMER: This is a confidential assessment report for use by the person specified above. The information in the report should
only be disclosed on a “need to know basis” with the prior understanding of the candidate. Assessment results are not infallible and
may not be entirely accurate. Best practice indicates that any organisation’s career management decisions should depend on factors
in addition to these assessment results. Harambee cannot accept responsibility for decisions made based on the information
contained in this report and cannot be held liable for the consequences of those decisions.

This figure shows an example of the certificates given to candidates in the certification treatment. Each certificate
shows some information about the assessments, the candidate’s assessment results, the candidate’s name and
national identity number, and the logo of the World Bank and the implementing agency. Each workseeker received
20 printed certificates, an email copy of the certificate, and guidelines on how to request more certificates.
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Each candidate receives their certificates during a group briefing with a psychologist. The
psychologist explains what each assessment measures and how to interpret the results on the certificate. They explain that workseekers can, but do not have to, attach the certificate to future job
applications and that they can request more certificates from Harambee. To ensure briefings were
standardized, the research team and Harambee psychologists jointly developed a briefing script and
PowerPoint presentation. Research assistants monitored each briefing to ensure psychologists used
the script.
3.2

Experimental Design

We randomly divide our workseeker sample into a certification group, a control group, and other
groups discussed in the next section. We randomize treatment by assessment date to reduce risks of
spillovers between treated and control workseekers, assigning 2,247 workseekers assessed on 27 days
to certification and 2,274 workseekers assessed on 27 days to the control group. Table D.1 shows
that the randomization generates balanced treatment assignments. Treated and control workseekers
differ in only one way: treated workseekers receive the certification intervention described above,
while control workseekers receive no information about their assessment results and no certificate
to enable them to share results with firms. All treated and control workseekers receive roughly one
hour of job search counselling before the assessments on how to create an email address and how to
prepare and dress for an interview. They also receive an email with a CV template, interview tips,
and job search tips.14 This differs from the design in Abebe et al. (2020a), where treated workseekers
receive both skill certification and job search counselling while control workseekers receive neither.
We estimate treatment effects using models of the form
Yid = Td · ∆ + Xid · Γ + Sd + id ,

(1)

where Yid is the outcome for workseeker i assessed on date d, Td is a vector of treatment assignments, and Xid is a vector of prespecified baseline covariates. Sd is a block fixed effect, to account
for the fact that we randomly assign days to treatment groups within blocks of 6-10 sequential
days. We use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by assessment date, the unit of
treatment assignment. All labor market and job search measures use 7-day recall periods, except
where we specify otherwise. We apply an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to right-skewed
variables such as earnings; the distributions of these variables in our sample allow us to interpret
these treatment effects as percentage changes. We assign zeros to job characteristics for non-working
with only cardinal scores or both rankings and cardinal scores.
14
Harambee invites some workseekers for further training and job search assistance. These invitations depend
partly on their assessment results and may only be issued months after assessment. By the endline survey, only 1.4%
of our sample are invited for further interaction with Harambee and only 0.17% receive a job offer through their
further interaction with Harambee. These outcomes are uncorrelated with treatment status and all our results are
robust to dropping these workseekers.
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Table 1: Treatment Effects on Labor Market Outcomes
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Employed Hoursc Earningsc Hourly wagec
Treatment
0.052
0.201
0.338
0.197
(0.012)
(0.052)
(0.074)
(0.040)
Mean outcome
0.309
8.85
159.3
9.84
Mean outcome for employed
28.85
518.3
32.28
# observations
6607
6598
6589
6574
# clusters
84
84
84
84

(5)
Written contract
0.020
(0.010)
0.120
0.392
6575
84

Coefficients are from regressing each outcome on a vector of treatment assignments, randomization block fixed
effects, and prespecified baseline covariates (measured skills, self-reported skills, education, age, gender, employment, discount rate, risk aversion). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors shown in parentheses, clustering
by treatment date. Mean outcome is for the control group. All outcomes use a 7-day recall period. Outcomes
marked with c use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation for the treatment effects but the control group
means are reported in levels. All monetary figures are reported in South Africa Rands. 1 Rand ≈ USD 0.167 in
purchasing power parity terms. The sample sizes differ across columns due to item non-response, mostly from
respondents reporting that they don’t know the answer.

respondents (e.g. earnings, hours) and to search measures for non-searching respondents (e.g. number of applications submitted) to avoid sample selection. We thus analyze treatment effects on
realized outcomes, rather than latent outcomes that may be non-zero for the non-employed or nonsearching. We also estimate quantile treatment effects on selected outcomes, which allows us to
focus on the distribution of outcomes for only employed candidates.
The estimating equations and variable definitions are prespecified. We report treatment effects
on some outcomes that are not prespecified but note when we do so. In Appendix D, we show that
our results are robust to prespecified adjustments for multiple testing and omitting the prespecified
covariates Xid .
3.3

Certification Improves Labor Market Outcomes

The first main effect of certification is to increase employment. Current employment rises by 5.2
percentage points from a control group mean of 30.1 percentage points (Table 1, column 1). We also
ask about employment in each calendar month between treatment and endline and show in Table
D.10 that certification increases employment in every month between treatment and follow-up.
Certification increases average weekly hours worked by 20% (column 2). We code hours worked
as zero for non-employed candidates. So the treatment effect on hours may reflect two effects: an
extensive margin effect if treatment increases the employment rate and an intensive margin effect if
treatment increases the hours that employed candidates work. We adapt a decomposition proposed
by Attanasio et al. (2011) to identify these two effects (details in Appendix C). We define the extensive margin effect as the treatment effect on employment multiplied by mean hours worked for
employed control group candidates. Intuitively, this is the rise in hours we would see if treatment
increased employment but the marginally and inframarginally employed treated candidates worked
14

Table 2: Treatment Effects on Labor Market
(1)
Hoursc
Total effect
0.201
(0.052)
Extensive margin
0.189
(0.042)
Intensive margin
0.013
(0.020)
Treatment effect conditional
0.036
on employment
(0.058)

Outcomes at Extensive and Intensive Margins
(2)
(3)
(4)
Earningsc
Hourly wagec Written contract
0.338
0.197
0.020
(0.073)
(0.039)
(0.010)
0.269
0.141
0.020
(0.059)
(0.031)
(0.005)
0.069
0.056
-0.000
(0.040)
(0.028)
(0.008)
0.195
0.159
-0.001
(0.113)
(0.078)
(0.024)

This table reports decompositions of treatment effects on job characteristics into extensive and intensive margin
effects. The extensive margin effects are the treatment effects on job characteristics due to the treatment effect
on employment, evaluated at the mean job characteristics for the control group. The intensive margin effects
are the differences between the treatment effects and extensive margin effects, which must be due to changes
in job characteristics for the employed candidates in the treatment group. The conditional effect is the implied
mean change in job characteristics per employed treatment group candidate. Treatment group employment is
36%, so the conditional effects on all outcomes are roughly three times larger than the corresponding intensive
margin effect. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses, clustering by treatment date.
All outcomes use a 7-day recall period. Outcomes marked with c use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation.

the same average hours as the inframarginally employed untreated candidates. We define the intensive margin effect as the difference between the total treatment effect on hours and the extensive
margin effect on hours. We find that the entire effect on hours is explained by the extensive margin
effect (Table 2, column 1). This shows that treated candidates do not work longer hours conditional
on employment, but are simply more likely to be employed.
The second main effect of certification is to increase earnings. Weekly earnings increase by 34%
(Table 1, column 3). 27 percentage points of the 34% increase in earnings is explained by the rise
in employment (the extensive margin effect, shown in Table 2, column 2). This implies an intensive
margin increase in earnings of 7 percentage points per candidate. Hourly wages, calculated by
dividing earnings by hours, also increase by 20% (Table 1, column 4). The extensive and intensive
margins account for respectively 14 and 6 percentage points of the 20% increase in wages (Table 2,
column 3). These results show that treatment increases earnings mainly by increasing employment,
but also increases earnings conditional on employment.
These results are consistent with the conceptual framework: more information about workseeker
skills (i.e. types) increases the latent value of some workseeker-job matches, leading to higher
employment and mean earnings conditional on employment. This explanation also matches the
quantile treatment effects on earnings. These are positive throughout the earnings distribution,
consistent with broad increases in match value rather than an increase only in low-value, low-wage
matches (Figure 2). The earnings results are not consistent with a special case of the framework
where more information increases only job-finding rates but not the output of firm-worker matches,
which would not change earnings conditional on employment.
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Figure 2: Quantile Treatment Effects on Earnings
Panel A: Empirical Distributions of Earnings in Control and Public Certification Groups
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Panel B: Quantile Treatment Effects of Public Certification on Earnings
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Panel A shows the empirical distributions of earnings in the control and public certification groups. Earnings
are the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of earnings in South African Rands, with 1 Rand ≈ 0.167 USD
in purchasing power parity terms. Earnings are coded as zero for candidates who are not working. The vertical
axis in Panel A is truncated below at the 60th percentile because earnings below that value are zero. Panel B
shows the quantile treatment effects (QTEs) of public certification. These are unconditional QTEs, estimated
without controlling for any covariates or stratum fixed effects. The 95% pointwise confidence intervals allow
heteroskedasticity and clustering by treatment date. The confidence intervals exclude zero at all percentiles
except 73-74, 86, and 93-99.
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Finally, certification increases by 2 percentage points the probability of having a written contract,
Statistics South Africa’s definition of a formal job (Table 1, column 5). This effect is entirely
explained by the higher employment rate (Table 2, column 4). Consistent with this result, 4
percentage points of the 5.2 percentage point increase in employment are in wage employment,
and only 1.2 percentage points into self employment. Wage and self employment status are not
prespecified outcomes.
The effects on employment and earnings are substantial and easily exceed the cost of the program. The employment effect is almost three times larger than the mean standardized short-run
effect size of active labor market programs reviewed by Card et al. (2018), larger than the effect of
an intervention that helped similar South African workseekers get reference letters from past employers (Abel et al., 2020), and similar to the effect of a program that subsidized firms to hire South
African workseekers from similar backgrounds (Levinsohn et al., 2013). The average earnings gain
in the first three months after treatment is 778 South African Rands (USD 130 PPP) – 5.6 times
the average variable cost of certification alone and 2.3 times the average variable cost of assessment
and certification (details in Appendix B). The average weekly earnings gain is equal to 17% of the
weekly adult poverty line in South Africa (details in Appendix D.2).

4

Separating Workseeker- and Firm-side Information Frictions

Certification may increase employment and earnings by providing information to firms, to workseekers, or both sides of the market. This distinction matters for modeling information frictions
and designing government or market-based remedies to information frictions. In this section, we
show that both sides of the market change behavior in response to new information. Our argument
proceeds in three steps. First, we show that public certification changes workseekers’ beliefs and
search behavior in ways that are consistent with the existence of either firm- or workseeker-side
information frictions, or both. Second, we discuss another arm of our workseeker experiment that
reveals information only to workseekers. The results of this intervention, compared to the effects of
public certification, are consistent with both firm- and workseeker-side information frictions existing. The results are not consistent with only one-sided frictions, either for workseekers or for firms.
Third, we discuss an audit-style experiment that reveals information only to firms. The results of
this experiment are consistent with firm-side information frictions.
4.1

Certification Changes Job Search and Beliefs

We document three patterns in the effects of certification on workseekers’ beliefs and job search
behavior. First, certification shifts workseekers’ beliefs about their skills closer to their measured
skills. We ask candidates if they think they scored in the top, middle, or bottom third on each
of the six assessments compared to other candidates assessed by Harambee. Certification increases
the fraction of assessments where candidates’ self-assessments match their measured results from
17

0.39 to 0.55 (Table 3, column 1).15 In contrast, certification has no effect on candidates’ self-esteem
(column 2). This shows that their updated beliefs about the skills do not lead to more general
updating about their self-worth.
Second, certification changes the types of jobs that candidates target. We ask candidates if the
types of jobs they are applying for most value communication, concept formation, or numeracy.
Certification increases the fraction of candidates searching for jobs that most value the assessment
in which they scored strictly highest from 0.16 to 0.21 (column 3).16
Third, candidates use certificates in job applications (columns 4-7). 70% of candidates use the
certificates with at least one job application between treatment and endline, with an unconditional
average of 6.7 applications sent per candidate.17 Applications with certificates generate an average
of 0.43 interviews and 0.11 job offers over the 3-4 months from treatment to endline.
The first two patterns suggest a role for workseeker-side frictions: candidates align their beliefs
and job search more closely to their assessment results, potentially leading to better outcomes in the
labor market. The third pattern suggests a role for firm-side information frictions: candidates use
reports with job applications, potentially making the applications more informative to employers,
leading to more job interviews and offers. Some combination of these patterns leads candidates to
expect 11% more offers in the next month, from a control group mean of 4.2 offers (column 8).
Taken together, these three patterns are consistent with certification reducing both firm- and
workseeker-side information frictions. However, these three patterns are not sufficient to show
whether reducing only one of these frictions could generate the employment and earnings effects
of certification. For example, the revised search targeting might by itself increase employment and
earnings. Alternatively, the certificates attached to job applications might by themselves increase
employment and earnings. We therefore run two more experiments that separately manipulate the
information available to firms and workseekers.
Before proceeding to the next experiments, we note that certification does not change multiple
prespecified measures of job search effort in the month before the endline: the probability of doing
any search, number of applications submitted, hours spent searching, and money spent on search
(Table D.10). There are two possible explanations for this pattern. First, certification may change
how workseekers search – targeting different jobs and using certificates in applications – without
15
This question measures candidates’ beliefs about their assessment results. These may differ from their beliefs
about their domain-specific skills if, for example, they believe the assessments are noisy measures of their skills. To
address this possibility, we ask candidates if their communication and numeracy skills are in the top, middle, or bottom
third of people aged 18-34, from disadvantaged backgrounds, with high school education (the population typically
assessed by Harambee). This is not a question about their result on a specific assessment. Treatment increases the
share of the two skills where candidates’ beliefs match their assessment results by 12.4 percentage points (standard
error 2.2 p.p.). This shows that candidates’ updated beliefs are not assessment-specific. We collect this measure only
for a random 50% sample of the first 3,000 candidates to complete the survey.
16
This search targeting measure is not prespecified. The result is similar for the fraction of candidates searching
for jobs that most value the assessment in which they think they scored highest.
17
The 6.7 additional applications with reports follows from the 1.682 unit effect on the inverse hyperbolic since of
the number of applications in column 5, and the fact that control workseekers send zero applications with reports
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Table 3: Public and Private Certification Effects on Beliefs, Search, and Labor Market Outcomes
(1)
(2)
(3)
Skill belief
> median
Targeted
accurate
self-esteem
search
Public certification
0.158
0.001
0.052
(0.008)
(0.013)
(0.010)
Private certification
0.123
-0.002
0.047
(0.008)
(0.014)
(0.010)
p: public = private
0.000
0.806
0.698
Mean outcome
0.389
0.553
0.155
# observations
6607
6609
6609
# clusters
84
84
84
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Used
Applications
Interviews
Offers
Expected
reportb
with reportb,c with reportb with reportb
offersa,c
Public certification
0.699
1.682
0.432
0.112
0.106
(0.013)
(0.040)
(0.023)
(0.011)
(0.019)
Private certification
0.289
0.572
0.144
0.036
0.053
(0.012)
(0.033)
(0.017)
(0.008)
(0.023)
p: public = private
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.025
Mean outcome
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
4.198
# observations
6609
6598
6597
6597
6531
# clusters
84
84
84
84
84
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
Hourly
Written
Worked
Hoursc
Earningsc
wagec
contract
Public certification
0.052
0.201
0.338
0.197
0.020
(0.012)
(0.052)
(0.074)
(0.040)
(0.010)
Private certification
0.011
0.066
0.162
0.095
0.017
(0.012)
(0.048)
(0.078)
(0.046)
(0.009)
p: public = private
0.002
0.011
0.028
0.030
0.769
Mean outcome
0.309
8.848
159.291
9.840
0.120
# observations
6607
6598
6589
6574
6575
# clusters
84
84
84
84
84
Coefficients are from regressing each outcome on a vector of treatment assignments, randomization block fixed
effects, and prespecified baseline covariates (measured skills, self-reported skills, education, age, gender, employment, discount rate, risk aversion). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors shown in parentheses, clustering
by treatment date. Mean outcome is for the control group. Skill belief accurate is the share of the six assessments
where the candidate’s perceived tercile matches their actual tercile. Targeted search is an indicator equal to one
if the candidate reports mainly applying for jobs that most value the skill in which the candidate scored highest.
Above-median self-esteem is an indicator equal to one if the candidate’s response on a shortened version of the
Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale is above the sample median. All outcomes use a 7-day recall/forecast period
unless marked with a (30-day recall/forecast period) or b (since treatment). Outcomes marked with c use the
inverse hyperbolic sine transformation for the treatment effects but the control group means are reported in levels. All monetary figures are reported in South Africa Rands. 1 Rand ≈ USD 0.167 in purchasing power parity
terms. The sample sizes differ across columns due to item non-response, mostly from respondents reporting that
they don’t know the answer.
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changing their search effort. This is consistent with a special case of the conceptual framework
where information frictions change how firms and workseekers match but do not change the share
of workseekers who choose to search. Second, certification may temporarily change extensive or
intensive margin search effort but the endline may occur too late to detect this change. Employment
already rises in the first month after treatment (Table D.10). This suggests that any changes
in workseeker behavior that increase employment occur soon after treatment. The search effort
questions use 7- or 30-day recall periods, which miss the period soon after treatment when candidates
may have increased effort and found jobs. The questions on certificate use ask about the entire
period between treatment and the endline survey, which will capture any short-term changes in
search behavior.18
4.2

Workseekers Face Information Frictions

In this section, we explore whether revealing information only to workseekers can replicate the
employment and earnings effects of our certification intervention. If not, then it is likely that
certification does not work by addressing only workseeker-side information frictions.
We implement a ‘private’ certification intervention, distinct from the ‘public’ certification intervention described above. Candidates assigned to the private certification intervention receive an
unbranded, anonymous certificate with the assessment results rather than the branded, identifiable
‘public’ certificate (Figure 3). We interpret the private treatment as primarily providing information
to the workseekers about their own types.
Candidates in this group receive only one black-and-white, unbranded copy of the report, printed
on low-quality paper, and do not receive an electronic version. Candidates receive a briefing from
a psychologist about the assessment results. But this briefing does not encourage them to share
the certificate with firms or suggest that this is possible, unlike the briefing received by candidates
in the public certification group. Candidates in the public certification, private certification, and
control groups all receive the same one hour of job search counselling and email with job search
advice. We assign 2,114 candidates assessed over 27 assessment days to private certification. We
simultaneously randomize days to public certification, private certification, and control. The three
groups are balanced on baseline characteristics (Table D.1).
The private and public certification interventions have similar effects on workseekers’ beliefs
and search targeting. Private certification makes workseekers’ beliefs about their own skills more
accurate and has no effect on self-esteem (Table 3, columns 1-2).19 The private and public effects
18

Consistent with this timing explanation, effects on all search effort measures are marginally larger for respondents
with a shorter time between treatment and endline. This result is robust to instrumenting the treatment-to-endline
time with the random order in which candidates were assigned to be surveyed.
19
The private certification effect on beliefs about skills is slightly smaller than the public certification effect. The
former effect may be smaller because the public treatment conveys information differently (e.g. the branding makes
it more credible to workseekers) or because the information is more likely to be retained (e.g. workseekers are more
likely to keep copies of the public report or discuss it in recent job interviews). To separate these hypotheses, we
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Figure 3: Sample Private Certificate

REPORT ON CANDIDATE COMPETENCIES
-Personal CopyThis report contains results from the assessments you took at Harambee in Phase 1 and Phase 2. These results can help
you learn about some of your strengths and weaknesses and inform your job search.
You completed assessments on English Communication (listening, reading and comprehension) and Numeracy today in
Phase 2. In Phase 1, you completed a Concept Formation assessment which asked you to identify patterns.
1. The Numeracy tests measure various maths abilities. Your score is the average of the two maths tests you did
today at Harambee.
2. The Communication test measures English language ability through listening, reading and comprehension.
3. The Concept Formation test measures the ability to understand and solve problems. Candidates with high scores
can generally solve complex problems, while lower scores show an ability to solve less complex problems.
You also did some games and questionnaires to measure your soft skills:
4. The Planning Ability Test measures how you plan your actions in multi-step problems. Candidates with high
scores generally plan one or more steps ahead in solving complex problems.
5. The Focus Test looks at your ability to pick out which information is important in confusing environments.
Candidates with high scores are able to focus on tasks in distracting situations.
6. The Grit Scale measures candidates’ determination when working on difficult problems. Candidates with high
scores spend more time working on the problems rather than choosing to pursue different problems.
Your results have been compared to a large group of young South African job seekers who have a matric
certificate, are from socially disadvantaged backgrounds and have been assessed by Harambee.
You scored in the MIDDLE THIRD of candidates assessed by Harambee for Numeracy, MIDDLE THIRD for
Communication, LOWER THIRD for Concept Formation, LOWER THIRD for Planning Ability, MIDDLE
THIRD for Focus and TOP THIRD for the Grit Scale.

Planning Ability

DISCLAIMER
Please note that this is a confidential assessment report and is intended for use by the person specified above. Assessment results are not infallible and may not be
entirely accurate.

Note: This figure shows an example of the certificates given to candidates in the private treatment arm. The
certificates contain the candidate’s assessment results but no identifying information and no branding. Each
candidate received one copy of this certificate.
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on search targeting are almost identical (column 3). Candidates in the private arm expect to receive
5% more offers than control candidates, significantly less than the 11% increase in expected offers
in the public arm (column 8). This suggests that workseekers view the new information as useful,
but less useful than also being able to communicate their assessment results to firms.
The private certification intervention has substantially smaller effects than public certification
on candidates’ outcomes in the labor market. Private certification effects on the probability of
employment and hours worked are positive but small, not significantly different from zero, and significantly smaller than the public certification effects (columns 9-10). Private certification increases
earnings and hourly wages but both effects are less than half the size of the public certification
effects and significantly smaller (columns 11-12).
Results from both the public and private certification interventions are consistent with quantitatively important information frictions facing both workseekers and firms. Giving information to
workseekers in both the public and private certification interventions increases the accuracy of their
beliefs about their skills, allowing better search targeting, and leading to higher earnings. When
workseekers can also credibly convey that information to firms, as in the public intervention, they
are more likely to be employed and have even higher earnings and wages.
There are two ways that these results might reflect only firm-side or only workseeker-side information frictions, but we view both as unlikely. First, the private certification may deliver some
information to firms and this information, rather than changes in workseeker beliefs or search targeting, may generate the positive private effect on earnings. This explanation is consistent with
the fact that some candidates report using private certificates in job applications, although private
effects on certificate use are on average one third as large as the public effects (Table 3, columns 4-7).
We cannot conclusively rule out this interpretation but we view it as unlikely. The private reports
do not have the candidate’s name and identity number, so they cannot be linked to a particular
candidate. They have no branding, from Harambee or the World Bank. They do not explain that
Harambee has used these assessments widely to place candidates with companies or that assessments predict workplace productivity and do not link to a website. None of the 15 hiring managers
interviewed during piloting reported that they would view the private reports as credible.
Second, the public certification effects on employment and earnings may be larger than the
private effects because workseekers incorrectly believe that firms face information frictions. Under
this explanation, workseekers in the public certification group believe that firms are more likely to
respond to job application submitted with certificates, hence they search more or search differently
using a method or in a time period we do not measure. These changes in search behavior may
generate higher employment and earnings, even if firms face no information frictions and do not
measure workseekers’ beliefs about their skills using a text message survey 2-3 days after treatment. The public
and private effects in this survey are not different to each other, suggesting that workseekers’ beliefs update in the
same way straight after receiving the reports and that the difference in the endline survey 3-4 months later is due to
differential retention. See Appendix D and Table D.8 for details.
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respond to certificates. In the next section, we address this possibility by discussing an experiment
that directly manipulates firms’ information, without any scope for changes in workseeker behavior.
4.3

Firms Face Information Frictions

In this section, we show that revealing information only to firms changes their responses to job
applications, without allowing any potentially mediating behavior by workseekers. This is consistent
with firms facing information frictions and the employment and earnings effects of certification being
partly explained by firm-side information frictions.
We describe results from an audit-style study, with more details on the experiment in Appendix
E. We invite a random sample of assessed candidates to send us a resume that we will forward
to prospective employers on their behalf. We create a list of job vacancies by scraping online
job advertisements. We eliminate scam vacancies and vacancies that require work experience or
university education, where many candidates in our sample would be ineligible. We send resumes
from 4 randomly chosen candidates to each vacancy, each from a different email address. We
generate two outcome variables based on the email responses from firms. ‘Interview invitations’
are invitations to interview with the firm. ‘Any responses’ are similar to ‘callbacks’ in other audit
studies and include interview invitations and requests to provide more information by email or by
visiting the firm in person.
We randomize each vacancy to receive either 1 or 3 resumes with public certificates attached. We
also randomize which of the resumes are chosen to receive public certificates. This design motivates
the estimating equation
Yrv = Certificaterv · β1 + Certificaterv · HighIntensityv · β2 + Vv + Xr · Γ + Erv + rv ,

(2)

where Yrv is the response to resume r sent to vacancy v, Certificaterv is an indicator equal to
one if the application includes a public certificate, HighIntensityv is an indicator equal to one if the
vacancy receives 3 applications with certificates rather than 1, Vv is a vector of vacancy fixed effects
that subsumes the main effect of HighIntensityv , Xv is a vector of prespecified resume covariates,
and Erv is a vector of fixed effects for the email addresses used to submit the applications. We
cluster standard errors by resume and vacancy.20
β1 , the effect of using a public certificate when other applications do not, is positive. Applications
with a public certificate are 1.6 percentage points more likely to get any response and 1 percentage
point more likely to get an interview invitation (Table 4, columns 2 and 4). These are substantial
effects, both equal to 11% of the control group means, although they are only statistically significant
at the 10% level.
20
Like most audit studies, we submit the same resume to multiple vacancies. Each resume includes a certificate
for half of these vacancies. Audit studies generally cluster standard errors by resume (Neumark, 2018). Abadie et al.
(2017) recommend clustering by the unit at which treatment is assigned. We therefore cluster by both vacancy and
resume. Results are very similar when clustering only by vacancy or only by resume.
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Table 4: Treatment Effects of Additional Information in Audit Study
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Any response
Interview request
Certificate (β1 )
0.015
0.016
0.009
0.010
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.004)
(0.006)
Certificate × HighIntensity (β2 )
-0.027
-0.028
-0.014
-0.017
(0.013)
(0.014)
(0.009)
(0.010)
Mean outcome
0.130
0.130
0.088
0.088
# applications
3992
3992
3992
3992
# vacancies
998
998
998
998
# resumes
717
717
717
717
Vacancy fixed effects
×
×
Email address fixed effects
×
×
Resume covariates
×
×
Note: Coefficients are from regressing each outcome on a vector of treatment assignments and, in columns 2 and
4, vacancy fixed effects, email address fixed effects, a vector of prespecified workseeker covariates (measured skills,
education, age, gender, past employment, and the scan quality of documents they include in their application).
The vacancy-level treatment HighIntensityv is included in columns 1 and 3 but omitted in columns 2 and
4 because it is collinear with the vacancy fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors shown in
parentheses clustered by resume and vacancy. The mean outcomes are for applications sent without public
certificates to vacancies that receive only one application with a public certificate.

These results show that more informative applications lead to higher callback and interview
invitation rates in a low-information environment. This suggests firm-side information frictions play
a role in the earnings and employment effects of public certification. Combining this result with the
observed effects of the public and private certification on workseekers’ beliefs, search behavior, and
outcomes in the labor market suggests that both firms and workseekers’ face information frictions.
β2 , the difference between the effect of being the only application with a public certificate sent
to a vacancy and the effect of being one of multiple applications with public certificates sent to
a vacancy, is negative. Applications that include a public certificate are 2.8 percentage points
less likely to get a response and 1.7 percentage points less likely to get an interview invitation
when they compete against other applications with reports (Table 4, columns 2 and 4). However,
more informative applications may still be valuable in a higher-information environment for job
offers, which we do not observe in the audit study, than callbacks and interviews. If firms use
callbacks and interviews to get more information, then certificates may allow them to interview
fewer candidates and still make better-matched hires. Jarosch and Pilossoph (2019) make a similar
argument, both theoretically and empirically, about audit studies that manipulate firms’ information
about applicants’ employment history.
There are, however, some caveats to the interpretation of the audit study results. This examines
only one hiring method (online applications) and one stage of that process (interview invitations).
These are standard limitations of correspondence-based audit studies. But it does mean that the
design cannot easily quantify the importance of firm-side information frictions relative to workseeker24

side information frictions on the same outcome. Furthermore, we randomly match workseekers to
vacancies in the audit study. This omits any role for search targeting, which the public and private
certification results suggest may be important. We therefore view the audit study as less important
evidence than the arms of the workseeker-facing experiments. It simply provides additional evidence
that the difference between the public and private certification results can be explained by firm-side
information frictions.

5

What Do Workseekers and Firms Learn From Skill Certification?

The preceding two sections show that skill certification provides information that improves workseekers’ outcomes in the labor market. In this section, we explore what workseekers and firms
learn from skill certification, what this implies for the effects of certification on different types of
workseekers, and what this might imply for the effects of certification at scale. This section relies
on smaller experiments and heterogeneity analysis of the main experiments, so we view these as
secondary results.
5.1

Assessment Results Matter, Not Just Being Assessed

The public certification and audit results above are consistent with three interpretations. First, our
preferred interpretation is that firms and workseekers acquire information about workseekers’ skills
from the assessment results. Second, firms may acquire information about workseekers’ tenacity
or proactivity from their choice to get assessed, not their actual assessment results. Third, the
assessment results may provide no useful information to firms but may be visually appealing or
attention-grabbing because they are colorful, branded, and printed on high-quality paper. In this
section, we discuss two smaller experiments whose results are consistent with the first, but not
the second or third interpretations. The first interpretation is also consistent with the private
certification results, while the second and third are not.
In the first experiment, we manipulate information about workseekers’ assessment results, holding constant the information that workseekers have been assessed and any visual appeal of the
certificates. We randomly assign 254 candidates from our workseeker sample, assessed over 3 days,
to a ‘placebo’ certification group. These candidates receive placebo certificates that are identical to
the public certificates except that the actual assessment results are omitted (Figure F.1) and the
psychologist’s briefing does not discuss the assessment results.
The placebo certification treatment has minimal effects on labor market outcomes (Table F.1). It
increases an index of labor market outcomes by 0.03 standard deviations. This is not significantly
different to zero and is significantly smaller than the public certification effect of 0.12 standard
deviations. This index is an inverse covariance-weighted average of the five labor market outcomes
discussed in Section 3.3: employment, hours, earnings, wages, and contract status. The placebo
certification effects on the five individual outcomes are all smaller than the public certification
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effects and are on average only 26% as large. But we cannot reject equality of the public and
placebo effects for some of the individual outcomes because the small size of the placebo sample
leads to large standard errors.
The second experiment measures firms’ willingness-to pay (WTP) for information on workseekers’ assessment results, conditional on knowing candidates have been assessed. We recruit 69
establishments located in commercial areas near the low-income residential areas in Johannesburg
where most workseekers in our sample live and are likely to work.21 We conduct a survey and WTP
exercise with the person responsible for hiring decisions at each of these establishments. We show
this person a secure online database containing assessment results, contact information, and selected
resume-style information for our 6,891 candidates. This database allows users to filter and search for
candidates with specific assessment results and obtain their contact information. See Figures G.1
and G.2 for selected screenshots of the database. We use a Becker-DeGroot-Marshak mechanism to
measure WTP for access to this database relative to a placebo database with candidates’ contact
information and selected resume-style information, but no assessment results.22
Firms’ WTP for access to the database with assessment results is substantial: 68% of firms
report positive WTP and the unconditional mean WTP is 1,161 South African Rands or USD 195
PPP (Figure G.3). Mean WTP is 224% of the mean weekly earnings for employed candidates in our
workseeker sample. This shows firms value information on specific assessment results, conditional
on knowing candidates have been assessed.
Both the placebo experiment and WTP measurement are consistent with the first but not second
or third interpretations above: information about assessment results is valuable, not just information
about whether candidates have been assessed or any visual appeal of the certificates. This provides
additional support for our preferred interpretation: public certification provides information about
workseekers’ types and facilitates more productive firm-worker matches.
5.2

Certification Facilitates Horizontal More Than Vertical Differentiation

Our conceptual framework distinguishes two types of workseeker differentiation. Under horizontal differentiation, type i workseekers are more productive than type j workseekers in type i jobs,
and vice versa. Under vertical differentiation, type i workseekers are more productive than type j
21
We recruit establishments by asking if they are willing to participate in a study on hiring and tell them we can
provide some useful information on hiring. We restrict the sample to establishments that have hiring responsibilities,
either single-establishment firms or branches of larger firms that hire independently. Most firms are in retail, have
multiple entry-level workers, expect to hire entry-level workers in the next year, and take on average four weeks to
fill a vacancy (Table G.1).
22
We tell firms the database normally costs 10,000 South African Rands (USD 1,670 PPP) for three months access,
ask how much they are willing to pay for access, and then randomly offer them a discount between 0 and 100%. If
their stated WTP is higher than the normal price minus the discount, we give them access to the database. If their
stated WTP is below the normal price minus the discount, we give them access to a placebo database with candidates’
contact information and selected resume-style information but no skill assessment results. We first explain the entire
mechanism and run a practice round with a bar of chocolate.
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workseekers in both type i and j jobs. The distinction is important for understanding how information frictions affect different types of workseekers. Under horizontal differentiation, alleviating
information frictions can help both types of workseekers by matching them with jobs where they
are more productive. Under vertical differentiation, alleviating information frictions can hurt type j
workseekers by reducing their probability of being mistaken for more productive type i workseekers.
In this section, we discuss three relevant patterns in our data. Two are consistent with horizontal
differentiation and one is inconsistent with vertical differentiation, providing suggestive evidence of
horizontal differentiation in this setting.
First, there is substantial heterogeneity in firms’ relative demand for different skills. We show
this using an incentivized choice experiment with the sample of 69 establishments described in
the previous subsection. We ask the person at each establishment responsible for hiring to rank
profiles of seven hypothetical candidates and tell them we will use their ranking to match them with
workseekers from the online database, following Kessler et al. (2019). Six of the profiles have middle
terciles for five assessments, and a top tercile for one assessment. There is substantial variation in
firms’ relative ranking of profiles (Table G.2). All six profiles’ median rank is between second and
fourth. The share of firms ranking each profile highest ranges from 6 to 33%. The seventh profile has
middle terciles for all six assessments and has a one-year post-secondary education certificate, while
the other six profiles have only completed secondary school. Only 9% of firms rank this profile first
and 76% of firms rank this last, showing that firms value the assessed skills relative to an alternative
signal of productivity in which workseekers might invest.23
Second, assessment results are weakly correlated across skills within candidate. Numeracy and
concept formation are most highly correlated, with ρ ≈ 0.5. But most other pairwise correlations are
substantially lower, with ρ < 0.1 for some pairs of skills (Table A.2). As a result, most candidates’
certificates show substantial variation across skills. Table A.3 shows that 88% of the candidates
have at least one top tercile but only 24% have four or more top terciles and only 2.3% have all top
terciles. 76% of the candidates have at least one bottom tercile but only 12% have four or more
bottom terciles and only 0.7% have all bottom terciles. 64% of candidates have both top and bottom
terciles. Other studies that measure multidimensional skills also find weak correlations across skills
within candidates (Almlund et al., 2011; Poropat, 2009).
Third, we do not find strong evidence of vertical differentiation in the public certification experiment. To test for vertical differentiation, we construct three indices that combine the six assessment
results in different ways: the number of top terciles minus bottom terciles, the first principal component of the cardinal scores, and a weighted average of the cardinal scores with weights based on
23

We conduct a second experiment where we ask firms to rank profiles with assessment results shown for some
skills and concealed for others. This assess whether firms value information about specific skills as well as the level of
the skills. The two experiments may yield different results if, for example, firms find skill S1 most valuable but believe
the assessments of skill S2 yield more new information. This second experiment also shows substantial heterogeneity
in firms’ ranking of different profiles.
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their association with earnings.24 The first index weights all skills equally, the second gives more
weight to skills that are highly correlated with each other, and the third gives more weight to skills
with higher associations with earnings. For each index, we construct an indicator for above-median
values of the index. We then include this indicator and its interactions with treatment assignments
in equation (1). The interaction effects with public certification on employment are smaller than 2
percentage points and not significantly different to zero for all indices (Table D.9) panel A.25
Taken together, these results are more consistent with horizontal than vertical differentiation.
Firms and workseekers both seem to face information frictions, and certification provides information
that facilitates more productive firm-worker matches that generate higher employment and earnings.
Employment and earnings rise for many different types of workers, not just those with high values of a
skill index of the six assessment scores. This is consistent with models of multidimensional skill where
information frictions can lead to poor matches between workseeker skills and firm requirements
(Fredriksson et al., 2018; Guvenen et al., 2020; Lise and Postel-Vinay, 2020).
However, our experiment is not designed to provide a general test of horizontal against vertical
differentiation. Certification may facilitate vertical rather than horizontal differentiation when it
is based on assessment of a single skill or assessments of multiple highly correlated skills; or when
certificates report a single summary measure of multiple skills. Certification may also facilitate
vertical rather than horizontal differentiation when it covers a larger share of the workforce. Our
sample excludes workseekers with advanced degrees or less than completed secondary education,
whose skills may be more vertically differentiated from the workseekers in our sample.
5.3

Certification Is More Effective When Other Information on Workseekers’ Skills
is Limited

If certification changes labor market outcomes by providing information about workseekers’ skills,
then it should be most effective when there are limited alternative sources of information on workseekers’ skills. These sources might include past work experience and post-secondary education,
which allow workseekers and firms to learn about workseekers’ productivity in specific tasks. We
test this idea by augmenting equation (1) to include interactions between treatment and proxies
for alternative sources of information. Public certification effects on employment are 2.7 percentage
points smaller for candidates with post-secondary education (standard error 2.8 p.p.) and 4.3 percentage points smaller for candidates with prior work experience (standard error 3.2 p.p.) (Table
D.9, panel B). We also estimate the latent probability of being employed at endline as a single
24

The weights equal the coefficients from regressing earnings on the cardinal scores using control group data. Results are similar for weighted averages based on the coefficients of regressions of control group earnings on polynomial
or spline functions of the skills.
25
Results are similar using the continuous indices instead of binary indicators and when using alternative model
specifications: allowing nonlinear interactions between skill indices, using different single indices, or using machine
learning methods to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects simultaneously across all individual scores.
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summary measure.26 Candidates with above-median latent probabilities of employment have 6.9
percentage point smaller public certification effects than candidates with below-median latent probabilities (standard error 2.8 p.p.). These results show that certification can substitute for traditional
sources of information about workseekers’ skills.27 This is consistent with evidence that educational
qualifications are more useful for members of groups facing statistical discrimination (Arcidiacono
et al., 2010).
5.4

Skill Certification at Different Scales

We show that skill certification at a relatively small scale increases employment and earnings for
certified workseekers. In this section we discuss conditions under which effects may vary with the
scale of skill certification.28
First, employment and earnings effects may depend on scale if certified workseekers displace
non-certified workseekers. It is unlikely that our experimental results are due to displacement of
non-certified workseekers in the control group. We certify only 2,247 workseekers in a metropolitan
area with roughly 8 million people and 2 million employed workers (Statistics South Africa, 2016).
The probability of certified and control group workseekers applying for the same jobs by chance
is very small, and Harambee does not encourage recently-assessed workseekers to apply to specific
jobs or search for work in specific areas.
It is possible that certified workseekers displace non-certified workseekers who are not part of
the experimental sample. We cannot directly test for this, but we can evaluate the mechanisms
that might generate it. Displacement is less likely if certification improves match quality and hence
increases the share of latent vacancies that are worth filling, as in our conceptual framework and
general equilibrium models of information frictions (Donovan et al., 2018; Jovanovic, 1979; Menzio
and Shi, 2011). Displacement is more likely if firms value certification for some reason other than
information (e.g. visual appeal) or if certification helps firms to identify a small set of universallydemanded workseekers and compete for them.
Our results are more consistent with the match quality mechanism. We find that firms’ demand
for different skills is heterogeneous, firms value learning about workseekers’ specific skill types,
26

We estimate the latent probabilities following Abadie et al. (2018). We regress endline employment on baseline
demographics, education, assessment results, beliefs about assessment results, employment, earnings, and search
behavior in the control group. We use the predicted values from these regressions in all treatment groups as latent
probabilities for employment, adjusting the predicted values in the control group using leave-one-out estimation to
avoid overfitting.
27
This result is not explained by a correlation between workseekers’ skills and their education and past employment.
We regress employment on treatment assignments, a single index measure of skill from Section 5.2, a measure of
information about workseekers’ skills from this section, and a full set of interactions. The interactions between public
certification and the single index skill measure remain close to zero, while the interactions between public certification
and the measure of information about workseekers’ skills remain negative.
28
There are few existing papers that study how the effects of specific active labor market policies change with
scale. For job search assistance policies specifically, Crépon et al. (2013) and Lise et al. (2004) find larger-scale policies
generate negative spillovers on non-participants, while Blundell et al. (2004) find no spillovers on non-participants.
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and the gains from certification are not limited to workseekers with specific skill profiles. All
these patterns suggest that firms and workseekers use certification to learn about workseekers’
skills and facilitate better matches between workseekers’ skills and firms’ demand. We also find
that certification increases earnings and hourly wages conditional on employment, suggesting that
certified workseekers are in more productive matches. We do find that the callback premium to
certification drops when certified applicants compete against each other. This is consistent with some
certified workseekers displacing other certified workseekers from interviews. However, as discussed
in Section 4.3, this does not necessarily imply that certified workseekers displace other certified
workseekers from hiring. Certification may allow firms to call back and interview fewer candidates
and still make better-matched hires, as shown by Jarosch and Pilossoph (2019).
Second, employment and earnings effects may depend on scale if the extent of limited information
varies across the population of either firms or workseekers. Consider the case where the population
is divided into fraction p of uninformed workseekers, who do not know their skills and cannot convey
their skills to firms, and fraction 1−p of informed workseekers, who know their skills and can convey
this information to firms. Assessing and certifying more than p share of workseekers will have limited
returns. Our finding that certification has larger employment and earnings effects when there are
limited alternative sources of information on workseekers’ skills is consistent with this possibility.
Our experiment does not identify the population shares of workseekers or firms facing information
frictions. The share of relatively uninformed types may be higher in our sample than the population,
as we study workseekers with poor baseline labor market outcomes. But Harambee’s workseeker
recruitment does not explicitly advertize assessments or information frictions, so workseekers are
unlikely to select into the sample specifically for assessment and certification.
Third, employment and earnings effects may depend on scale if certificate (non-)use conveys
information in general equilibrium. If, for example, all workseekers get assessed and certified but
only use certificates when applying to vacancies where their match quality is high, then firms may
infer that workseekers without certificates are poor matches for these vacancies. In another example,
some firms may choose not to use assessments in hiring if assessments are costly and they believe
they can infer workseekers’ types by observing their interactions with other firms (Lockwood, 1991).
Our experiments cannot speak to these general equilibrium mechanisms. But adding either of these
two mechanisms to our conceptual framework still predicts that any non-zero use of assessment and
certification will raise employment and earnings relative to no assessment and certification.
Even if reducing information frictions has decreasing effects on employment and earnings at
larger scales, it may still raise workseeker or firm welfare by reducing job search costs, vacancy
posting costs, and the frequency of bad hires that lead to separations. This interpretation is consistent with models showing that firm- and workseeker-level search and matching frictions, including
information frictions, can lower aggregate utility through multiple mechanisms, not just through
unemployment (Donovan et al., 2018; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Poschke, 2019).
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6

Conclusion

Workseekers make job search decisions and firms make hiring decisions using potentially limited
information about workseekers’ skills. Providing more information about workseekers’ skills may
reduce these information frictions and hence improve workseekers’ outcomes in the labor market. We
show that assessing workseekers’ skills and communicating the assessment results to both workseekers and firms increases assessed workseekers’ employment by 17% (5 percentage points), earnings
by 34%, and hourly wages by 20%. This shows that certification gets more workseekers into work
and into higher-paying jobs. The main contribution of our paper is to show that this reflects both
workseeker- and firm-side information frictions. The distinction between workseeker- and firm-side
frictions is important, as it informs how economists, government, or private firms might design
information-provision products.
We study a context and sample where information frictions are likely: work experience is limited,
education-skill relationships are relatively weak, hiring mistakes are costly, and reservation and
minimum wages are relevant. However, none of these features are unique to young workseekers
in South Africa. Formal education qualifications are weakly related to measured skills in many
countries (Pritchett, 2013). Many labor markets face more regulations governing hiring, firing,
and probation than in South Africa (Botero et al., 2004). Hiring mistakes may be costly even
when separations are unregulated, due to reposting and retraining costs. High rates of youth
unemployment in many countries are consistent with information frictions, as youths have less job
search and work experience that can reveal their skills to themselves or to firms (International
Labour Organization, 2017).
Our results suggest that, in similar contexts, providing information about workseekers’ skills may
be a valuable focus of government policy. Some existing job search assistance programs offer skill
assessments to workseekers (McCall et al., 2016). Adding certification to these assessments might
enhance their effectiveness at low cost. We find that adding certification to an existing assessment
program generates earnings gains for workseekers that easily exceed the cost of both assessment and
certification. Government involvement, through public-sector assessment programs or subsidies to
private-sector assessments, is likely to be particularly important for credit-constrained workseekers
(Abebe et al., 2020b). Better information about workseekers’ skills could also come from more
accurate assessments during formal education (MacLeod et al., 2017).
Our results suggest there may also be scope for market-based provision of information about
workseekers’ skills. We show that firms are willing to pay for access a database with information on
workseekers’ skill assessment results and contact information. We also ask workseekers in our sample how much of a hypothetical job search subsidy they would be willing to spend on certification.
They report 17%, compared to 24% on training and 27% on transport, suggesting the possibility
of charging workseekers for assessment services. Some large firms already use in-house psycho-
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metric assessments in hiring (Autor and Scarborough, 2008; Hoffman et al., 2018). Anecdotally,
psychometric assessments seem rarer in small firms, perhaps because in-house assessment systems
are unlikely to be cost-effective when hires are infrequent. There are some third-party providers of
assessment services around the world, including Harambee, LinkedIn, and the Manpower Group.
Our results show that providing more information through certification can be valuable even in
a labor market where some firms already use assessments, suggesting scope to grow this market.
There are important market design questions around third-party provision that might be addressed
in future work, such as which side(s) of the market will pay for assessment services, how third-party
providers can establish reputations, how precisely or coarsely information should be reported, and
under what conditions participants will opt into or out of assessment. This work might incorporate
existing models of screening and signalling when both agents and principals have limited information
(Alonso, 2018; Rosar and Schulte, 2012).
Our results also motivate future work on the interaction between different information provision
mechanisms. For example, we find that public certification is most effective for workseekers with
less work experience and without university education. This suggests that skill assessment and
certification can substitute for alternative sources of information about workseekers’ skills. Future
work could examine conditions under which skill assessment and certification are complements or
substitutes for network referrals, reference letters, or outsourcing agencies.29

References
Abadie, A., S. Athey, G. Imbens, and J. Wooldridge (2017): “When Should You Adjust
Standard Errors for Clustering?” Working Paper 24003, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Abadie, A., M. Chingos, and M. West (2018): “Endogenous Stratification in Randomized
Experiments,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 100, 567–580.
Abebe, G., S. Caria, M. Fafchamps, P. Falco, S. Franklin, and S. Quinn (2020a):
“Anonymity or Distance? Job Search and Labour Market Exclusion in a Growing African City,”
Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.
Abebe, G., S. Caria, and E. Ortiz-Ospina (2020b): “The Selection of Talent: Experimental
and Structural Evidence from Ethiopia,” Manuscript, University of Bristol.
Abel, M. (2019): “Unintended Labor Supply Effects of Cash Transfer Programs: New Evidence
from South Africa’s Pension,” Journal of African Economies, 28, 558–581.
29
We find one result consistent with certification enhancing the effectiveness of referrals, potentially by helping
network links to target referrals or making their referrals more credible to employers. Public certification slightly
increases the probability of securing a job through a formal application or interview after a referral. There is no
large or significant treatment effect on the probability of securing a job in other ways we measure: by approaching an
employer in person, dropping off an application, emailing an application, getting hired by a social contact directly,
or working at an employment broker. However, this result is only marginally statistically significant once we account
for multiple testing across the different ways of finding a job. Hence we view this as a suggestion for future work,
rather than a core result.

32

Abel, M., R. Burger, and P. Piraino (2020): “The Value of Reference Letters: Experimental
Evidence from South Africa,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, forthcoming.
Ahn, S., R. Dizon-Ross, and B. Feigenberg (2019): “Improving Job Matching Among Youth,”
Working Paper, Columbia University.
Aigner, D. and G. Cain (1977): “Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor Markets,”
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 30, 175–187.
Alfonsi, L., O. Bandiera, V. Bassi, R. Burgess, I. Rasul, M. Sulaiman, and A. Vitali
(2017): “Tackling Youth Unemployment: Evidence from a Labor Market Experiment in Uganda,”
Manuscript, University College London.
Almlund, M., A. Duckworth, J. Heckman, and T. Kautz (2011): “Personality Psychology
and Economics,” in Handbook of the Economics of Education, ed. by E. Hanushek, S. Machin,
and L. Woessmann, Elsevier, 1–181.
Alonso, R. (2018): “Recruiting and Selecting for Fit,” Manuscript, LSE.
Altmann, S., A. Falk, S. Jäger, and F. Zimmermann (2018): “Learning about Job Search:
A Field Experiment with Job Seekers in Germany,” Journal of Public Economics, 164, 33–49.
Altonji, J. and C. Pierret (2001): “Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 313–335.
Anderson, M. (2008): “Multiple Inference and Gender Differences in the Effects of Early Intervention: A Reevaluation of the Abecedarian, Perry Preschool, and Early Training Projects,” Journal
of the American Statistical Association, 103, 1481–1495.
Arcidiacono, P., P. Bayer, and A. Hizmo (2010): “Beyond Signaling and Human Capital:
Education and the Revelation of Ability,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2,
76–104.
Attanasio, O., A. Kugler, and C. Meghir (2011): “Subsidizing Vocational Training for Disadvantaged Youth in Colombia: Evidence from a Randomized Trial,” American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics, 3, 188–220.
Autor, D. and D. Scarborough (2008): “Does Job Testing Harm Minority Workers? Evidence
from Retail Establishments,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123, 219–277.
Bassi, V. and A. Nansamba (2020): “Screening and Signaling Non-Cognitive Skills: Experimental
Evidence from Uganda,” Manuscript, University of Southern California.
Beaman, L., N. Keleher, and J. Magruder (2018): “Do Job Networks Disadvantage Women?
Evidence from a Recruitment Experiment in Malawi,” Journal of Labor Economics, 36, 121–153.
Beaman, L. and J. Magruder (2012): “Who Gets the Job Referral? Evidence from a Social
Networks Experiment.” American Economic Review, 102, 3574–3593.
Belot, M., P. Kircher, and P. Muller (2018): “Providing Advice to Jobseekers at Low Cost:
An Experimental Study on Online Advice,” Review of Economic Studies, 86, 1411–1447.
Benjamini, Y., A. Krieger, and D. Yekutieli (2006): “Adaptive Linear Step-Up Procedures
That Control the False Discovery Rate,” Biometrika, 93, 491–507.
33

Bertrand, M. and B. Crépon (2019): “Teaching Labor Laws: Evidence from a Randomized
Trial in South Africa,” Manuscript, University of Chicago and CREST.
Bhorat, H., T. Caetano, B. Jourdan, R. Kanbur, C. Rooney, B. Stanwix, I. Woolard,
L. Patel, Z. Khan, L. Graham, K. Baldry, and T. Mqehe (2016): “Investigating the Feasibility of a National Minimum Wage for South Africa,” Manuscript, University of Johannesburg:
Centre for Social Development in Africa and University of Cape Town: Development Policy
Research Unit.
Bhorat, H. and H. Cheadle (2009): “Labour Reform in South Africa: Measuring Regulation
and a Synthesis of Policy Suggestions,” Development Policy Research Unit Working Paper 09/139,
University of Cape Town.
Blundell, R., M. C. Dias, C. Meghir, and J. Van Reenen (2004): “Evaluating the Employment Impact of a Mandatory Job Search Program,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 2, 569–606.
Botero, J., S. Djankov, R. L. Porta, F. Lopez-de Silanes, and A. Shleifer (2004): “The
Regulation of Labor,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 1339–1382.
Bryan, G., S. Choudhury, and A. M. Mobarak (2014): “Under-Investment in a Profitable
Technology: The Case of Seasonal Migration in Bangladesh,” Econometrica, 82, 1671–1748.
Card, D., J. Kluve, and A. Weber (2018): “What Works? A Meta-Analysis of Recent Active
Labor Market Program Evaluations,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 16, 894–931.
Chandrasekhar, A. G., M. Morten, and A. Peter (2020): “Network-Based Hiring: Local
Benefits; Global Costs,” Working Paper 26806, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Conlon, J., L. Pilossoph, M. Wiswall, and B. Zafar (2018): “Labor Market Search with
Imperfect Information and Learning,” Working paper 24988, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Crépon, B., E. Duflo, M. Gurgand, R. Rathelot, and P. Zamora (2013): “Do Labor
Market Policies Have Displacement Effects? Evidence from a Clustered Randomized Experiment,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128, 531–580.
Donovan, K., J. Lu, T. Schoellman, et al. (2018): “Labor Market Flows and Development,”
in 2018 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 976.
Falk, A., D. Huffman, and U. Sunde (2006): “Self-Confidence and Search,” IZA Discussion
Paper 2525.
Farber, H. and R. Gibbons (1996): “Learning and Wage Dynamics,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 111, 1007–1047.
Franklin, S. (2017): “Location, Search Costs and Youth Unemployment: Experimental Evidence
from Transport Subsidies,” The Economic Journal, 128, 2353–2379.
Fredriksson, P., L. Hensvik, and O. N. Skans (2018): “Mismatch of Talent: Evidence on
Match Quality, Entry Wages, and Job Mobility,” American Economic Review, 108, 3303–3338.

34

Garlick, R., K. Orkin, and S. Quinn (2019): “Call Me Maybe: Experimental Evidence on
Frequency and Medium Effects in Microenterprise Surveys,” World Bank Economic Review, forthcoming.
Guvenen, F., B. Kuruscu, S. Tanaka, and D. Wiczer (2020): “Multidimensional Skill Mismatch,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 12, 210–244.
Heath, R. (2018): “Why Do Firms Hire Using Referrals? Evidence from Bangladeshi Garment
Factories,” Journal of Political Economy, 126, 1691–1746.
Hoffman, M., L. Kahn, and D. Li (2018): “Discretion in Hiring,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 133, 1–36.
Ingle, K. and C. Mlatsheni (2017): “The Extent of Churn in the South African Youth Labour
Market: Evidence from NIDS 2008-2015,” Manuscript, University of Cape Town: Southern Africa
Labour and Development Research Unit.
International Labour Organization (2016): Enabling Environment for Sustainable Enterprises in South Africa, Geneva: International Labour Office.
——— (2017): Global Employment Trends for Youth 2017: Paths to a Better Working Future,
Geneva: International Labour Office.
Ioannides, Y. M. and L. D. Loury (2004): “Job Information Networks, Neighborhood Effects,
and Inequality,” Journal of Economic Literature, 42, 1056–1093.
Jarosch, G. and L. Pilossoph (2019): “Statistical Discrimination and Duration Dependence in
the Job Finding Rate,” Review of Economic Studies, 86, 1631–1665.
Jovanovic, B. (1979): “Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover,” Journal of Political Economy,
87, 972–990.
Kahn, L. (2013): “Asymmetric Information between Employers,” American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics, 5, 165–205.
Kahn, L. and F. Lange (2014): “Employer Learning, Productivity, and the Earnings Distribution:
Evidence from Performance Measures,” Review of Economic Studies, 84, 1575–1613.
Kerr, A. (2017): “Tax(i)ing The Poor? Commuting Costs in South African Cities,” South African
Journal of Economics, 85, 321–340.
Kessler, J., C. Low, and C. Sullivan (2019): “Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer
Preferences without Deception,” American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Lam, D., C. Ardington, and M. Leibbrandt (2011): “Schooling as a Lottery: Racial Differences in School Advancement in Urban South Africa,” Journal of Development Economics, 95,
121–136.
Lange, F. (2007): “The Speed of Employer Learning,” Journal of Labor Economics, 25, 1–35.
Levinsohn, J., N. Rankin, G. Roberts, and V. Schoer (2013): “Wage Subsidies and Youth
Employment in South Africa: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial,” Manuscript, University of Stellenbosch.
35

Lise, J. and F. Postel-Vinay (2020): “Multidimensional Skills, Sorting, and Human Capital
Accumulation,” American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Lise, J., S. Seitz, and J. Smith (2004): “Equilibrium Policy Experiments and the Evaluation of
Social Programs,” Working paper 10283, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Lockwood, B. (1991): “Information Externalities in the Labour Market and the Duration of
Unemployment,” Review of Economic Studies, 58, 733–753.
Mackay, A. (2014): Building Brands in a Rapidly Changing Market: Lessons for South Africa,
Yellowwood.
MacLeod, W. B., E. Riehl, J. Saavedra, and M. Urquiola (2017): “The Big Sort: College
Reputation and Labor Market Outcomes,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 9,
223–261.
Malindi, K. (2017): “Imperfect Information and The Racial Wage Gap for South African Men,”
Manuscript, University of Stellenbosch.
McCall, B., J. Smith, and C. Wunsch (2016): “Government-sponsored Vocational Education
for Adults,” in Handbook of the Economics of Education, ed. by E. Hanushek, S. Machin, and
L. Woessmann, Elsevier, vol. 5, 479–652.
Menzio, G. and S. Shi (2011): “Efficient Search on the Job and the Business Cycle,” Journal of
Political Economy, 119, 468–510.
Mortensen, D. and C. Pissarides (1999): “New Developments in Models of Search in the
Labor Market,” in Handbook of Labor Economics, ed. by O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, Elsevier,
2567–2627.
Neumark, D. (2018): “Experimental Research on Labor Market Discrimination,” Journal of Economic Literature, 56, 799–866.
Pallais, A. (2014): “Inefficient Hiring in Entry-Level Labor Markets,” American Economic Review,
104, 3565–3599.
Poropat, A. E. (2009): “A Meta-Analysis of the Five-Factor Model of Personality and Academic
Performance,” Psychological Bulletin, 135, 322–338.
Poschke, M. (2019): “Wage Employment, Unemployment and Self-employment across Countries,”
Manuscript, McGill University.
Pritchett, L. (2013): The Rebirth of Education: Schooling Ain’t Learning, Washington, DC:
Center for Global Development.
Rankin, N., C. Darroll, and T. Corrigan (2012): “SMEs and Employment in South Africa,”
Small Business Project, Johannesburg.
Rosar, F. and E. Schulte (2012): “Optimal Test Design under Imperfect Private Information
and Voluntary Participation,” Manuscript, University of Bonn.
Rosenberg, M. (1965): Society and the Adolescent Self-Image, Princeton University Press.

36

Schöer, V., M. Ntuli, N. Rankin, C. Sebastiao, and K. Hunt (2010): “A Blurred Signal? The Usefulness of National Senior Certificate (NSC) Mathematics Marks as Predictors of
Academic Performance at University Level,” Perspectives in Education, 28, 9–18.
Schöer, V., N. Rankin, and G. Roberts (2014): “Accessing the First Job in a Slack Labour
Market: Job Matching in South Africa,” Journal of International Development, 26, 1–22.
Statistics South Africa (2016): Quarterly Labor Force Survey Quarter 4 2016, Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.
Taylor, S., S. Van Der Berg, V. Reddy, and D. Janse van Rensburg (2011): “How Well
Do South African Schools Convert Grade 8 Achievement Into Matric Outcomes?” Working Paper,
Stellenbosch University.
Wheeler, L., E. Johnson, R. Garlick, P. Shaw, and M. Gargano (2019): “LinkedIn(to)
Job Opportunities? Experimental Evidence from Job Readiness Training,” Working paper, Duke
University.

37

Online Appendices
A

Assessments

We assess each workseeker’s skills in six domains. Most of the assessments are already used by
Harambee and by some large firms in South African during hiring. We do not claim that these are
the best possible assessments for predicting workplace performance. But these are assessments that
some market agents have chosen to use, have reasonable psychometric properties, and are correlated
with workplan performance in some settings.
A.1

Firms’ Use of Assessments

Harambee has used the numeracy, communication, and concept formation assessments since 2011
to select candidates for further job readiness training and recommend candidates to vacancies at
partner firms. Harambee has placed over 160,000 candidates in entry-level jobs using these assessments. Table A.1 shows how 33 large client firms in retail, hospitality, logistics and corporate
services require Harambee to use assessments when recommending candidates for interviews.
All firms used at least one assessment to screen candidates and 73% of firms used all three
assessments. In contrast, only 57% required certified results on the national high school graduation
exam and only 3% required references. This shows firms find this skill information useful relative
to other sources of information about prospective workers’ skills. Harambee also administers a set
of career aptitude measures provided by a psychometric testing firm. 67% of firms in this sample
used this assessment score to screen applicants, suggesting they value horizontal differentiation. We
could not include this assessment in the certification because it is a proprietary instrument.
We therefore selected three alternative measures of skills which would be unlikely to be correlated
with numeracy, communication, and concept formation. To select these, we conducted interviews
with 20 hiring managers to understand which other skills they valued in successful hires. Elsewhere,
we conducted a detailed literature review of measures and selected those most overlapping with
what firms valued (Esopo et al., 2018), which were also correlated with either earnings or measures
of workplace performance in some settings.
A.2

Description of Assessments

Concept formation is very similar to the Raven’s Progressive Coloured Matrices assessment (Raven
and Raven, 2003). It is a non-verbal measure of fluid intelligence, which captures the rate at
which people learn and their conceptual reasoning. It specifically assesses the ability to ignore
superficial differences and see underlying commonalities across situations and to use logic in new
situations. Meta-analyses identify measures of fluid intelligence as strong predictors of worker
productivity (Schmidt and Hunter, 1998; Schmidt et al., 2016). The Raven’s test is widely used
in hiring and selection (Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham, 2010), including in recent research in
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Table A.1: Firms’ Use of Psychometric Assessments in Hiring
% of firms using each piece of information to screen candidates
Assessment result for
Career
Criminal High school
#
CommuniConcept
aptitude
record
graduation
Reference
Sector
Numeracy
firms
cation
formation
profile
check
certificate
Hospitality
11
0.82
1.00
0.91
0.64
0.91
0.64
0.00
Retail
16
0.69
0.56
0.88
0.81
0.94
0.75
0.06
Corporate
6
1.00
1.00
0.83
0.33
1.00
0.00
0.00
Total
33
0.79
0.91
0.79
0.67
0.94
0.58
0.03
Table shows use of assessment results and other information by 33 firms that have long-term recruiting relationships with Harambee. Firms are coded as using an assessment if they require candidates to reach a certain
threshold score on the assessment to be eligible for interviews or training programs. Firms are coded as using
other documents if they require these to be submitted with the candidates’ application packages. The criminal
record check is a set of checks against government records that the candidate had no criminal record or bad
credit history. We observe only what information these 33 firms request from Harambee for candidates whom
Harambee shortlists for interview, not how firms use the information.

economics (Abebe et al., 2020b; Beaman et al., 2018). Scores on this assessment are correlated with
interview ratings, technical scores and supervisor ratings in several South African firms (De Kock
and Schlechter, 2009; Lopes et al., 2001; Taylor, 2013).
Numeracy focuses on practical arithmetic and pattern recognition. We calculate a single numeracy score using the inverse variance-weighted average of two numeracy assessment scores. The
more advanced assessment is developed by a large retail chain and used in their applicant screening
process, as they believe it identifies some of the skills needed by cashiers. The simpler assessment
was developed by a South African adult education provider (www.mediaworks.co.za) and assesses
proficiency in arithmetic used in high school: comparing different types of numbers; working with
fractions, ratios, money, percentages and units; and performing calculations with time and area.
Communication captures English language listening, reading and comprehension skills. The assessment was developed by a South African adult education provider (www.mediaworks.co.za) and
is designed to assess English proficiency for high school students. It evaluates both listening and
written comprehension. It focuses on ability to identify and recall the main message of a text or
passage, infer meaning of vocabulary through context clues, and infer meaning when information is
not directly stated. Both numeracy and communication skills are correlated with educational attainment and wages in OECD countries (Heckman et al., 2006; Heckman and Kautz, 2012; Hanushek
et al., 2015). There are also correlations between wages and numeracy (du Rand et al., 2011) and
wages and English communication skills (Casale and Posel, 2011) in South Africa, conditional on
education.
Grit is a self-reported measure of a candidate’s inclination to work on difficult tasks until they
are finished and whether they show perseverance to achieve long-term goals. This assessment is
a validated self-reported 8-item psychological scale (Duckworth et al., 2007). Grit correlates with
academic performance and workplace retention in the US (Eskreis-Winkler et al., 2014).
The assessment labelled Focus on certificates captures inhibitory control, the ability to distin39

guish relevant from irrelevant information, control one’s attention to focus on what is needed for a
task (Diamond, 2013) and guide thought and action in accordance with a goal (Posner and DiGirolamo, 1998). The assessment is a computerized version of the widely-used Stroop Test, using colors
(Stroop, 1935). Similar measures are correlated with employment status (Kalechstein et al., 2003)
and moderate the negative effects of workplace related stress, such as burnout and absenteeism, in
service sector jobs (Schmidt et al., 2007).
Planning measures how candidates behave when faced with complex, multi-step problems. The
assessment is adapted from the Hit 15 lab task (Gneezy et al., 2010). The computer and the subject
take turns adding either one, two or three points to the points basket. The goal is to be the first
player to reach 15 points. It captures ability to search for relevant information and anticipate the
consequences of actions. High planning scores predict retention rates among truckers in the US,
conditional on cognitive skills (Burks et al., 2009). Similar measures of complex planning skills are
correlated with wages in South Africa, controlling for fluid intelligence and education (Ederer et al.,
2015).
For the first 17 of the 84 assessment days, covering 26% of candidates, computer problems meant
that we used two self-reported psychological scales, labelled Control and Flexibility on the reports
instead of focus and planning. We used two subscales of the Personal Problem-Solving Inventory
(Hepner and Petersen, 1982). The Personal Control scale (control) captures whether candidates
take a systematic or impulsive and erratic approach when faced with new, challenging problems.
The Approach Avoidance (flexibility) scale captures whether candidates actively consider several
approaches to solving a problem or whether they pursue their first idea without thinking about
alternatives. These are not exact analogues of the tasks: they capture self-perceptions as well as
behaviors (Heppner, 1988). But scores are correlated in other samples: for example, the PSI is
correlated with the Stroop task (Rath et al., 2004). None of the main results in the paper are
substantially different between the sample using the focus and planning assessments and the sample
using the control and flexibility assessments.
We use the assessment scores in the paper in three ways. First, we use assessment scores as a
prespecified conditioning variable when estimating treatment effects. We use the concept formation,
communication, grit, and numeracy scores individually for this purpose. We combine the remaining
scores into a single measure by taking the first principal component of control and flexibility and
standardizing it, taking the first principal component of focus and planning and standardizing it,
and then appending the two principal components together. Second, we use assessment scores in the
heterogeneity analysis described in Section 5.2. We use only the scores observed for all candidates
(concept formation, communication, grit, and numeracy) for this analysis. Results are similar when
we restrict to the 74% of candidates who took the focus and planning assessments and use all six
assessments. Third, we use assessments in the firm-facing experiments described in Sections 5.1 and
5.2. The online platform reports all eight assessment results and explains that each candidate took
40

Table A.2: Correlations of Assessment Results
Panel A: Correlations In First 17 Days of Assessment (1,615 workseekers)
Concept formation Grit Numeracy Control
Flexibility
(Personal
(Approach
Control)
Avoidance)
Communication
0.337
0.127
0.386
0.237
0.126
Concept formation
0.108
0.489
0.174
0.098
Grit
0.163
0.507
0.334
Numeracy
0.212
0.107
Control
0.173
Panel B: Correlations In Remaining 67 Days of Assessment (5,276 workseekers)
Concept formation Grit Numeracy
Focus
Planning
(Stroop)
(Hit 15)
Communication
0.346
0.088
0.393
0.171
0.258
Concept formation
0.094
0.519
0.225
0.292
Grit
0.129
0.049
0.106
Numeracy
0.162
0.325
Focus
0.181
Table shows pairwise correlation coefficients between assessment results. The sample is split because two of the
assessments changed after the first 17 days of assessment, from the control and flexibility scales to the focus
and planning tasks. None of the pairwise correlations between the four assessments used for the entire period
(communication, concept formation, grit, and numeracy) are substantively or statistically significantly different
between the two periods.

Fraction with _
bottom terciles

Table A.3: Distribution of Top, Middle, and Bottom Terciles Shown on Candidates’ Reports
Fraction with _ top terciles
Total
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0 0.001 0.007 0.025 0.032 0.029 0.018 0.007
0.119
1 0.009 0.036 0.059 0.064 0.037 0.011
0.215
2 0.027 0.077 0.079 0.040 0.011
0.235
0.187
3 0.054 0.076 0.048 0.009
4 0.070 0.059 0.009
0.138
5 0.060 0.024
0.084
6 0.023
0.023
Total
0.243 0.279 0.220 0.146 0.076 0.029 0.007
Table shows the share of the sample with i top terciles and j top terciles on their
reports for each i, j ∈ {0, 6}. The number of middle terciles equals 6 − i − j.
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only six of the eight assessments. The profile-ranking exercise does not use the control or flexibility
scales.
A.3

Administration of Assessments

All assessments are conducted in English, the same language used for all Harambee interaction with
candidates. All assessments are conducted on desktop computers, so the assessment results may be
sensitive to candidates’ computer skills. To minimize this sensitivity, all candidates do some practice
computer exercises before the assessments and all assessments are designed to be completable within
the available time limit. Before starting assessments, candidates consent to their assessment results
being shared with Harambee, the research team, and external firms.
Registered industrial psychologists employed or contracted by Harambee oversaw administration
of all assessments. They also delivered briefings to candidates to interpret results. Finally, the lead
psychologist at Harambee approved the language on certificates. This ensures compliance with
South African law on psychometric testing in workplace settings.
A.4

Validation of Self-Reported Psychological Scales and Tasks

We use four self-reported psychological scales in the paper: grit, control and flexibility are used as
skills measures, while self-esteem is used as an outcome measure. We followed standard procedures
in psychology to ensure the self-reported scales were well-understood and valid as measures. See
Esopo et al. (2018) for a full discussion of the process followed. We use the same seven-point Likert
scale for all scales.
The Problem-Solving Inventory had already been validated in South Africa with young black
African students of a very similar demographic profile to our sample and we used this item wording
(Pretorius, 1993; Heppner et al., 2002). For grit and self-esteem, we ensured language used was wellunderstood by conducting cognitive debriefings with 20 Harambee candidates. Cognitive debriefing
captures the underlying cognitive processes that respondents use to answer questions to detect
and solve problems in questionnaires (Tourangeau, 2003; Willis, 2008, 1999). For example, the
interviewer asks for specific information relevant to the question or the answer given. Examples of
probes used are “What does the term mean to you?”, “Can you repeat this question to me in your
own words?” and “What made you answer the way that you did?” We simplified the wording of
some items and altered some culturally specific idioms in response to the cognitive debriefings.
Second, we estimated the extent to which different items in each scale move together, using
Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951). All assessments have α > 0.65. Third, we administered the
scales twice for 150 candidates, ten days apart. We estimated Lin’s Concordance Correlation Coefficient (Lawrence and Lin, 1989) between the two administrations. All assessments have ρc > 0.62.
Fourth, we check if any items on the scales have very low variation across candidates using maximum endorsement frequencies. No items meet the threshold for being dropped due to insufficient
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variation from Bowling (2014).
The terciles shown on the assessment results are based on assessment results from candidates
assessed before the study started: 5,000 workseekers for communication, numeracy and concept
formation test, and 500 workseekers for the other skills. Tercile assignments are largely unchanged
if we retrospectively construct them using our full sample of assessed workseekekers.
Table A.2 shows the correlation of assessment results for the different skills. Numeracy, concept
formation and communication have pairwise correlations of 0.34 to 0.52. Numeracy and communication assessments capture acquired knowledge, often from schooling, which is often positively
correlated with fluid intelligence. This is potentially because learning at a higher rate improves acquisition of knowledge (Heckman and Kautz, 2012; Nisbett, 2009; Roberts et al., 2000). However, as
we intended, these are less strong correlations between the other tasks (focus and planning) and the
scales (grit, flexibility, and planning). These suggest the certificates will horizontally differentiate
workseekers from one another.

B

Implementation Costs

This appendix reports the costs of the public certification intervention and compares these to gains
experienced by treated workseekers, showing that the latter easily exceed the former. We measure
costs from the Harambee and J-PAL Africa financial statements. All costs are reported in 2016/7
PPP USD terms and are averaged over the 2,247 candidates who received the public certification
intervention. The cost figures in nominal USD are 42% of the cost figures in PPP USD, though this
does not affect the cost-benefit comparisons. We report average variable costs and, where these are
possible, total and average fixed costs. The average variable costs may change with scale but we do
not attempt to project scale effects on costs.
The average variable cost of adding certification to Harambee’s existing assessment operation
was USD 23.10. This included report printing, software license fees, website hosting fees, the time
of J-PAL and Harambee staff used to prepare the reports, and the time of Harambee psychologists
used to conduct briefings. This also included a USD 10.32 transport subsidy to each participant
to cover the cost of travel to the Harambee office, which is arguably not a necessary cost of the
intervention. These cost calculations exclude the private and placebo certifications, audit study,
and firm-facing experiments.
The average variable cost of certification and assessment was USD 57.27 per participation. This
included all certification-only costs, facility rental, computer rental, data and internet costs, and
the time of Harambee staff who administered the assessments. Facility and computer rental costs
were the largest line items for the assessment cost, jointly accounting for USD 23.43.
The average variable costs exclude fixed costs such as licenses for the assessment tools, market research into firm preferences over assessments, and senior management fees. For these costs we either
cannot calculate a meaningful average fixed cost or cannot reliably separate Harambee’s total fixed
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costs for developing the assessment program from its costs of other activities. J-PAL Africa’s fixed
cost for developing the certification program on top of the assessment program was approximately
USD 17,685 or USD 7.87 per candidate who received the public certification intervention. This
covered J-PAL Africa staff costs during development and all costs of piloting the certificates with
firms and workseekers. This includes the cost of developing and piloting the private and placebo
certifications, which we cannot easily separate from the public certification, but excludes the costs
of developing and piloting the audit study and firm-facing experiments.
We compare these average costs to the average benefit per participant who received the public
certification intervention over the first three months after the intervention. Public certification
increases average earnings by USD 9.05 in the week before the endline survey and the endline
survey occurred on average 14.4 weeks after treatment. Multiplying these together gives an average
effect on earnings since treatment of USD 130.2: 5.6 times higher than the average variable cost of
certification, 2.3 times higher than the average variable cost of assessment and certification, and 2.0
times higher than the average variable cost of assessment and average variable and fixed costs of
certification. The gains to treated workseekers over just three and a half months easily exceed the
cost of public certification and assessment.
The preceding calculation assumes that the treatment effect on weekly earnings does not vary
through time from treatment to the endline. The public certification effect on earnings does not
substantially vary with the time period from treatment to endline. But the treatment effects on
recalled employment in the first and second months after treatment are not identical, suggesting
a possible time trend (Table D.10). To account for this, we convert the weekly earnings effect
into monthly terms and multiply this by the sum of the employment effect in the first month after
treatment, the second month after treatment, and the week before the endline. This gives an average
on earnings since treatment of USD 110.1, which also easily exceeds the cost of public certification
and assessment.

C

Labor Market Effects at the Extensive and Intensive Margins

Treatment effects on labor market outcomes such as earnings and hours can occur at the extensive
margin – due to treatment effects on employment – and at the intensive margin – due to treatment
effects on job characteristics conditional on employment. This distinction is important, as intensive
margin effects indicate that treatment is changing the type of jobs candidates secure. The intensive
margin effects are not identified from regressions of labor market outcomes on treatment indicators
for employed candidates, as the set of employed candidates may be selected based on treatment
assignment.
We adapt a method from Attanasio et al. (2011) to decompose of labor market effects into
extensive and intensive margins. We describe the decomposition here for earnings, but the same
idea applies to any labor market outcome that is observed only for the employed. We use the term
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“treatment” to refer to the public certification. Using the law of iterated expectations and the fact
that observed earnings are zero for non-employed candidates, we can write the average treatment
effect on earnings as:
E[Earn|T reat = 1] − E[Earn|T reat = 0]
{z
}
|

(3)

ATE for earnings

= (E[Earn|T reat = 1, W ork = 1] − E[Earn|T reat = 0, W ork = 1]) · P r[W ork = 1|T reat = 1]
|
{z
} |
{z
}
Treated employment rate

ATE for earnings | employment

+

E[Earn|T reat = 0, W ork = 1] · (P r[W ork = 1|T reat = 1] − P r[W ork = 1|T reat = 0]) .
|
{z
} |
{z
}
ATE for employment

Control earnings | employment

We define the second line on the right-hand of the regression as the extensive margin effect. Intuitively, this is the average treatment effect on employment ‘priced’ at the mean earnings value in
the control group. If treatment has no effect on the employment rate, then this expression is zero.
We define the first line on the right-hand side of the regression as the intensive margin effect. If
treatment only changes the employment rate but has no effect on earnings for employed candidates,
then this term is zero.30
All terms in equation (3) except the average treatment effect on earnings conditional on employment are identified by the experiment and can be consistently estimated using sample analogues.
Hence, we can consistently estimate the remaining term using the formula in (3). We obtain standard errors by estimating all quantities as a system and using the Delta method.
This decomposition applies to realized earnings, which are zero by definition for non-employed
candidates. This decomposition does not apply to latent earnings, which may be non-zero for
non-employed candidates. Alternative methods are available for studying latent earnings. One
set of approaches point identifies the average treatment effect on latent earnings by modeling the
selection process into employment and adjusting observed earnings for selection (e.g. Gronau, 1974
and Heckman, 1974). Another set of approaches bounds the average treatment effect on latent
earnings by assuming that the earnings for the non-employed fall in some region of the observed
earnings distribution (e.g. Lee, 2009 and Manski, 1989). Neither approach is ideal in our setting:
the former methods require an instrument for selection into employment that we do not have and the
latter methods will yield wide bounds given the large effect of public certification on employment.
Another set of approaches point identifies quantile treatment effects on latent earnings by assuming
that the earnings for the non-employed fall in some region of the observed earnings distribution
(e.g. Powell, 1984). Our analysis of quantile treatment effects has a similar flavor to this approach,
30

Attanasio et al. (2011) show that the intensive margin effect can be further decomposed into two terms: the
treatment effect on earnings conditional on candidates’ baseline characteristics, and the difference in baseline characteristics between employed candidates in the treatment and control groups. However, neither of these terms is point
identified. Separating these effects is not important in our application. Our conceptual framework is consistent with
certification either increasing the same workseekers’ latent treated wages conditional on employment, or increasing
mean wages conditional on employment by helping workseekers with higher latent treated wages get employed.
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Figure C.1: Density of Earnings in Control and Public Certification Groups
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This figure shows the densities of earnings in the control and public certification groups. To account for
the positive treatment effect on employment, the treatment density is scaled by the ratio of employment
in the treatment group to employment in the control group. Hence the vertical difference between the
densities at each earnings level E represents the treatment effect on the share of all candidates earning
E, not on the share of employed candidates earning E. The density is estimated only for the employed,
so candidates with zero earnings are excluded.

though we do not directly interpret these as effects on latent earnings.
As discussed in Section 3.3, this decomposition shows that the earnings and wage effects of
public certification occur at both the extensive and intensive margins. The hours and contract type
effects occur only at the extensive margin.
The intensive-margin effect on earnings is also visible in the distributions and densities of earnings for the public certification and control groups. Figure 2 (in the main text) shows the distributions of earnings for each group and the quantile treatment effects of public certification. Figure C.1
shows the densities of earnings for employed candidates in the control and treatment groups. We
rescale the latter density by the ratio of treatment group to control group employment. Hence, the
vertical difference between the densities at each earnings level E represents the treatment effect on
the share of all candidates earning E, not on the share of employed candidates earning E. The treatment effect on the earnings density is almost entirely above median earnings for employed control
group candidates. This shows that either the marginal candidates employed only when treated earn
more than most inframarginal control candidates, or treatment increases earnings for inframarginal
candidates, or both.
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D
D.1

Additional Results about Workseeker Experiments
Summary Statistics and Balance Tests

This section reports summary statistics for the baseline workseeker sample (Table D.1) and endline
workseeker sample (Table D.2). Balance tests for equal means of baseline measures are also reported in the final column of Table D.1. Table D.3 compares our workseeker sample to the broader
population of the country and of Gauteng province, where the study took place.
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Table D.1: Summary Statistics for Baseline Variables
Variable
# obs Mean
Std
10th
dev.
pctile
Panel A: Demographic Measures
Age
6891
23.6
3.3
19.8
Male
6891
0.382
0.486
University degree / diploma
6891
0.167
0.373
Any other post-secondary qualification
6891
0.212
0.409
Completed secondary education only
6891
0.610
0.488
Panel B: Assessment Results
Numeracy score
6891
0.052
0.988 -1.187
Communication score
6891
0.050
0.992 -1.093
Concept formation score
6891
0.047
0.991 -1.516
Grit score
6891
0.031
0.992 -1.313
Other scores
6891 -0.002 1.070 -1.305
Panel C: Labor Market Measures
Employed
6891
0.378
0.485
Earnings
2116
565
740
100
Ever worked
6877
0.704
0.457
Ever held a long-term job
6877
0.090
0.286
Panel D: Job Search Measures
Searched
6891
0.968
0.175
a
Applications submitted
6815
9.9
18.6
2.0
Search cost
6147
242
1520
30
Search hours
6699
17.0
20.8
2.0
Offers receiveda
6810
1.20
7.20
0.00
Panel E: Belief Measures
Planned applicationsa
6840
48.9
1629.9
4.0
Correct about all assessment results
6891
0.082
0.274
Incorrect about all assessment results
6891
0.290
0.454
Overconfident about all assessment results
6891
0.219
0.413
Underconfident about all assessment results 6891
0.010
0.100

90th
pctile

p:balance

28.3

0.583
0.267
0.889
0.642
0.794

1.411
1.694
1.260
1.279
1.318

0.523
0.206
0.764
0.089
0.859

1400

20.0
400
48.0
2.00
36.0

0.468
0.083
0.418
0.696
0.058
0.809
0.276
0.231
0.280
0.252
0.960
0.961
0.732
0.783

Table shows summary statistics for selected baseline variables. Percentiles are omitted for binary variables. All
monetary figures are reported in South Africa Rands. 1 Rand ≈ USD 0.167 in purchasing power parity terms.
In this table, intensive-margin labor market measures (e.g. earnings) are set to missing for non-workers, and
intensive-margin search measures (e.g. search cost) are set to missing for non-searchers. All assessment results
are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one in the control group. Missing values reflect
item non-response, mostly due to respondents reporting that they don’t know the answer. All period-specific
outcomes use a 7-day recall/forecast period unless marked with a (30-day recall/forecast period). The final
column reports the p-value for testing equality of means of the baseline variables across all treatment groups,
using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by treatment date.
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Table D.2: Summary Statistics for Endline Variables
Variable
# obs Mean Std dev. 10th pctile
Panel A: Labor Market Measures
Employed
6607 0.323
0.468
Earnings
2112
623
1183
2
Hours worked
2121
28.5
21.6
4.0
Hourly wage
2097
33.1
72.3
0.1
Wage employment
2102 0.885
0.319
Self employment
2102 0.114
0.318
Panel B: Job Search Measures
Any search
6608 0.692
0.462
Applications submitteda
6577
12.8
21.5
1.0
Hours searched
6601
9.9
14.2
0.0
Search cost
6599
116
167
0
Responsesa
6593 0.861
2.147
0.000
Offersa
6592 0.207
0.680
0.000
Panel C: Belief Measures
Fraction of assessments overconfident
6607 0.345
0.237
Fraction of assessments underconfident 6607 0.176
0.166
Targeted search
6891 0.175
0.380
a
Planned applications
6591
16.1
29.7
3.0
Expected offersa
6531
4.49
5.70
1.00

90th pctile

1500
56.0
77.8

27.0
25.0
300
2.000
1.000

30.0
10.00

Table shows summary statistics for selected endline variables. Percentiles are omitted for binary variables. All
monetary figures are reported in South Africa Rands. 1 Rand ≈ USD 0.167 in purchasing power parity terms.
Intensive-margin labor market measures (e.g. earnings) are set to missing for non-workers. Intensive-margin
search measures (e.g. search cost) are set to zero for non-searchers. Missing values reflect item non-response,
mostly due to respondents reporting that they don’t know the answer. All period-specific outcomes use a 7-day
recall/forecast period unless marked with a (30-day recall/forecast period).

Table D.3: Comparison between the Workseeker Sample and External Populations
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Gauteng Gauteng
Study sample
South Africa
province age 18-29
of workseekers
Age
28.914
31.461
23.776
23.646
(19.606)
(19.099)
(3.326)
(3.299)
Male
0.489
0.504
0.512
0.382
Currently Employed
0.290
0.375
0.346
0.378
Currently Searching
0.102
0.151
0.302
0.984
< complete secondary school
0.737
0.612
0.429
0.011
Complete secondary school
0.184
0.255
0.449
0.610
> complete secondary school
0.072
0.120
0.116
0.379
Table compares the sample of workseekers in this study (column 4) to several external benchmarks: the country
(column 1), the province of Gauteng where the study takes (column 2), and people in Gauteng in the eligible
age range for the study (column 3). National and provincial statistics are calculated from the Quarterly Labour
Force Surveys (QLFS), averaging over all 2016 waves and using post-stratification weights supplied by Statistics
South Africa. QLFS data are not available by city but the greater Johannesburg metropolitan area where the
study is conducted accounts for over half the population of the Gauteng province. Standard deviations are shown
in parentheses for all continuous variables.
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D.2

Benchmarking The Magnitude of The Earnings Effects

In this section we show that the earnings effects are substantial relative to two local benchmarks.
Minimum wage: During our study period, minimum wages in South Africa varied by sector
and location. Sector- and location-specific minimum wages were either set by the Ministry of Labour
or in bargaining councils, where large firms and unions agreed minimum wages that applied to all
firms (Budlender et al., 2015; Isaacs, 2016). Table D.4 shows minimum wages for urban areas at
the time of the study for several sectors relevant to workseekers in our sample.
Poverty Lines: South African poverty research often uses poverty lines based on the cost of
purchasing 2100 calories plus the average amount spent on non-food items by households whose
food expenditure equals the food poverty line (Budlender et al., 2015; Leibbrandt et al., 2012).
Using this definition, the adult monthly poverty line just before the study period was 1,386 South
African Rands or USD 232 in purchasing power parity terms (Isaacs, 2016, p.22).
The average treatment effect on earnings is equal to 17% of the adult monthly poverty line or
7-9% of the monthly minimum wage at the time of the study.

Table D.4: Benchmarking Earnings Figures to Minimum Wage and Poverty Lines
Panel A: South African poverty lines and minimum wages at baseline
Monthly
Weekly aaa
Date
ZAR USD
ZAR
USD
Poverty line
Adult
Early 2016 1386
232
320
54
Household (4 people)
Early 2016 5544
927
1279
214
Minimum wage
Domestic work
Hospitality
Wholesale and retail
Private security/contract cleaning

2015-2016
2015-2016
2015-2016
2015-2016

2550
2750
3250
3500

427
460
544
585

588
634
750
808

98
106
125
135

Panel B: Benchmarking sample earnings and certification treatment effects on earnings
Weekly
As % of poverty line
As % of min. wage
Date
ZAR USD Adult
Household
Hospitality Retail
Baseline mean earnings if employed
Late 2016
562
94.1
1.76
0.44
0.89
0.75
Endline mean earnings
Early 2017
159
26.6
0.50
0.12
0.25
0.21
Endline mean earnings if employed
Early 2017
518
86.7
1.62
0.41
0.82
0.69
Treatment effect
Early 2017 54.1
9.05
0.17
0.04
0.09
0.07
Calculations assume 1 Rand ≈ 0.167 USD in purchasing power parity terms; 4.33 weeks per month. Household
poverty lines assume households of four people with only one earner. Control group respondents work 29 hours
per week conditional on being employed; earnings for those in full time work will be higher than mean earnings
here. Poverty lines are from Isaacs (2016, p.22) and minimum wages are from the Department of Labor for
2015. Minimum wages are for large urban areas (Area A). They are for hospitality businesses with less than 10
employees and shop assistants in the wholesale and retail sector.
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D.3

Non-response

The phone survey after 3-4 months is our main source of endline data. We use a text message survey
after 2-3 days only to measure beliefs about numeracy and self-esteem. The response rates for the
text message and phone surveys are respectively 83 and 96%. Non-response does not differ by
treatment arm (Table D.5). Non-response does not differ over most baseline characteristics (Table
D.6). Men are less likely to respond in both surveys. Higher numeracy and concept formation scores
predict higher response rates in the text message survey. Higher grit predicts lower response rates
in the endline survey.

Table D.5: Non-response by Treatment Group in Each Post-Treatment Survey Round
(1)
(2)
Text Message Survey
Endline Phone Survey
Control
0.170
0.040
(0.013)
(0.006)
Public
0.177
0.039
(0.011)
(0.004)
Private
0.182
0.044
(0.010)
(0.004)
Placebo
0.142
0.047
(0.032)
(0.026)
p: Control = Pvt.
0.481
0.632
p: Control = Pub.
0.670
0.855
p: Pvt. = Pub.
0.785
0.388
p: Control = Pvt. = Pub.
0.778
0.681
p: Control = Plc.
0.414
0.787
p: Pvt. = Plc.
0.238
0.888
p: Pub. = Plc.
0.297
0.746
p: Control = Pvt. = Pub. = Plc.
0.641
0.841
# observations
6891
6891
# clusters
84
84
Coefficients show the fraction of each treatment group that does not complete each follow-up survey round.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by treatment date are shown in parentheses.
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Table D.6: Non-response by Baseline Covariates Group in Each Post-Treatment Survey Round
(1)
(2)
Text Message Survey
Endline Phone Survey
Completed at most high school
-0.008
-0.003
(0.012)
(0.005)
Numeracy score
-0.029
0.003
(0.006)
(0.003)
Communication score
0.008
0.003
(0.006)
(0.003)
Concept formation score
-0.019
0.002
(0.006)
(0.003)
Grit score
-0.001
-0.007
(0.005)
(0.003)
Other scores
0.001
-0.002
(0.004)
(0.003)
Perceived numeracy score
-0.000
-0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
Perceived literacy score
0.014
-0.003
(0.010)
(0.005)
Perceived concept formation score
0.010
-0.003
(0.009)
(0.004)
Self-esteem index
0.006
0.002
(0.004)
(0.002)
Age
-0.002
0.001
(0.001)
(0.001)
Male
0.049
0.014
(0.010)
(0.005)
Employed
-0.005
-0.001
(0.008)
(0.005)
Above median discount factor
0.012
0.007
(0.009)
(0.005)
Respondent is present-biased
0.016
0.007
(0.011)
(0.006)
Above median risk aversion
-0.007
0.001
(0.008)
(0.005)
p: All coefficients jointly zero
0.000
0.041
Mean outcome
0.170
0.040
# observations
6891
6891
# clusters
84
84
Coefficients are from regressions of round-specific attrition on the list of baseline covariates displayed here.
All assessment scores are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one in the control group.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by treatment date are shown in parentheses.
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D.4

Additional Treatment Effects

Table D.7 shows the public certification effects of our main labor market outcomes without conditioning on the prespecified covariates. The results are very similar with or without the covariates.
Table D.8 shows public and private certification effects at two points in time: in the text
message survey conducted 2-3 days after treatment and the endline phone survey conducted 3-4
months after treatment. This table shows four patterns, which expand on the discussion in footnote
19 of the paper. First, both treatments make candidates more likely to report that their assessment
result matches their actual assessment result immediately after treatment. Second, both treatment
effects decline over the following 3-4 months, although the different survey methods mean the time
comparison should be interpreted cautiously. Third, the public treatment effect on self-beliefs is
significantly larger than the private effect after 3-4 months but not after 2-3 days. This suggests
that the larger public treatment effect at 3-4 months does not occur because the information it
conveys is immediately more credible or easier to understand than the private treatment. Instead,
it may be larger because the information is more memorable or the public treatment generates other
effects, such as more job interviews or employment that provide more opportunities to learn about
skills. Fourth, neither treatment affects self-esteem at either point in time.
Table D.9 shows how treatment effects on employment vary by single index summary measures
of candidates’ skills (Panel A) and baseline candidate characteristics that might provide alternative
measures of candidates’ skills (Panel B). We discuss these treatment effects in Sections 5.2 and 5.3
of the paper.
Table D.10 reports public and private certification effects on all prespecified workseeker-level
job search and labor market outcomes. These are organized into families of conceptually similar
outcomes, which we use for multiple testing adjustments. First, we report q-values that control
the false discovery rate across outcomes within each family (Benjamini et al., 2006). None of
the q-values in this table are substantively different to the corresponding p-values reported in the
main paper. Second, we estimate treatment effects on inverse covariance-weighted averages of
the outcomes within each family (Anderson, 2008). This provides a single summary test of the
information contained across all outcomes in the same family. None of the the treatment effects
on these averages provide substantively different information to the treatment effects on individual
outcomes.
We omit some prespecified outcomes related to beliefs from this paper and analyze them in
separate work. The search targeting measure discussed in Section 4 is not prespecified. We did not
prespecify an analysis plan for the smaller extension experiments discussed in Section 5.
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Table D.7: Treatment Effects on Labor Market Outcomes Without Covariates
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
c
c
c
Employed Hours
Earnings Hourly wage Written contract
Treatment
0.046
0.175
0.336
0.206
0.018
(0.013)
(0.058)
(0.076)
(0.041)
(0.010)
Mean outcome
0.309
8.848
159.291
9.840
0.120
Mean outcome for employed
28.847
518.291
32.283
0.392
# observations
6607
6598
6589
6574
6575
# clusters
84
84
84
84
84
Coefficients are from regressing each outcome on a vector of treatment assignments and randomization block fixed
effects without any other covariates. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors shown in parentheses, clustering
by treatment date. Mean outcome is for the control group. All outcomes use a 7-day recall period. Outcomes
marked with c use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. The sample sizes differ across columns due to item
non-response, mostly from respondents reporting that they don’t know the answer.

Table D.8: Treatment Effects on Self-Beliefs through Time
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Perceived numeracy tercile correct
Above-median self-esteem
Public
0.233
0.315
0.001
-0.001
(0.013)
(0.015)
(0.013)
(0.015)
Private
0.200
0.333
-0.002
0.016
(0.015)
(0.016)
(0.014)
(0.015)
p: public = private
0.010
0.240
0.806
0.239
Mean outcome
0.396
0.399
0.553
0.479
# observations
6601
5297
6609
5027
# clusters
84
84
84
84
Coefficients are from regressing each outcome on a vector of treatment assignments, randomization block fixed
effects, and prespecified baseline covariates (measured skills, self-reported skills, education, age, gender, employment, discount rate, risk aversion). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors shown in parentheses, clustering
by treatment date. Mean outcome is for the control group. Above-median self-esteem is an indicator equal to
one if the candidate’s response on a shortened version of the Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale is above the
sample median. Columns (1) and (3) report results from the main phone follow-up survey. Columns (2) and (4)
report results from the text message survey conducted 2-3 days after treatment. The sample sizes differ across
columns due to item non-response, mostly from respondents reporting that they don’t know the answer.
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Table D.9: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Employment
(1)
(2)
Panel A: Heterogeneous Effects by Single Index Skill Measures
Public treatment
0.052
0.052
(0.011)
(0.011)
× Share top - share bottom terciles
0.019
(0.028)
× PC1 (Scores)
0.004
(0.025)
× Earnings-weighted average of scores
# observations
6607
6607
# clusters
84
84
Panel B: Heterogeneous Effects by Alternative Information Sources
Public treatment
0.052
0.052
(0.011)
(0.012)
× post-secondary education
-0.027
(0.028)
× employed at baseline
-0.043
(0.032)
× P̂r(Employed at endline | X)
# observations
# clusters

6607
84

6607
84

(3)
0.054
(0.012)

-0.007
(0.029)
6603
84
0.051
(0.012)

-0.069
(0.028)
6607
84

Coefficients are from regressing each outcome on a vector of treatment assignments, displayed interaction terms,
randomization block fixed effects, and prespecified baseline covariates (measured skills, self-reported skills, education, age, gender, employment, discount rate, risk aversion). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors shown
in parentheses, clustering by treatment date. The measures used for interactions in Panel A and column 3 of
Panel B are indicators for above-median values of the underlying indices. All measures in panels A and B are
demeaned before being interacted with treatment, so the coefficient on the treatment indicator equals the average
treatment effect. P̂r(employed at endline | X) is estimated by regressing endline control group employment status on the baseline covariates listed above and predicting employment for all candidates. Prediction for control
group candidates uses leave-one-out-estimation to avoid overfitting. PC1 (Scores) is the first principal component
of the skills. The earnings-weighted average of scores is the weighted average of the assessment results, with
weights derived from a regression of control group earnings on assessment results.
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Table D.10: Treatment Effects on Prespecified Outcomes with Multiple Testing Adjustments
(1)
Index
-0.012
(0.032)
0.006
(0.032)

(2)
Any search
-0.020
(0.014)
-0.006
(0.014)
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.695
6608
(2)

(3)
Applicationsa,c
0.018
(0.042)
0.036
(0.038)
1.000
1.000
1.000
12.356
6577
(3)

(4)
(5)
Search hoursc
Search costc
Public
-0.035
-0.092
(0.048)
(0.081)
Private
-0.035
-0.031
(0.049)
(0.088)
q: Public effect = 0
1.000
1.000
q: Private effect = 0
1.000
1.000
q: Public = private effect
1.000
1.000
Mean outcome
0.001
9.791
112.684
# observations
6608
6601
6599
(1)
(4)
(5)
Responses per
Offers per
Index
Responsesa,c
Offersa,c
applicationa
applicationa
Public
0.016
0.023
0.006
0.000
-0.000
(0.029)
(0.024)
(0.013)
(0.004)
(0.003)
Private
0.019
0.016
0.013
-0.005
0.001
(0.026)
(0.022)
(0.013)
(0.004)
(0.004)
q: Public effect = 0
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
q: Private effect = 0
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
q: Public = private effect
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
Mean outcome
-0.023
0.871
0.195
0.099
0.030
# observations
6593
6593
6592
5944
5943
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Applications
Interviews
Offers
b
Index
Used report
with reportb,c
with reportb,c
with reportb,c
Public
NA
0.699
1.682
0.432
0.112
(0.013)
(0.040)
(0.023)
(0.011)
Private
NA
0.289
0.572
0.144
0.036
(0.012)
(0.033)
(0.017)
(0.008)
q: Public effect = 0
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
q: Private effect = 0
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
q: Public = private effect
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
Mean outcome
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
# observations
6609
6598
6597
6597
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Employed
Employed
Employed
Index
Hoursc
in last week
in month 1
in month 2
Public
0.137
0.052
0.036
0.058
0.201
(0.025)
(0.012)
(0.011)
(0.014)
(0.052)
Private
0.049
0.011
0.028
0.009
0.066
(0.028)
(0.012)
(0.013)
(0.015)
(0.048)
q: Public effect = 0
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
q: Private effect = 0
0.504
0.142
0.504
0.336
q: Public = private effect
0.003
0.132
0.002
0.008
Mean outcome
0.001
0.309
0.465
0.437
8.848
# observations
6609
6607
6604
6607
6598
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Hourly
Written
Index
Earningsc
wagec
contract
Public
0.106
0.338
0.197
0.020
(0.028)
(0.074)
(0.040)
(0.010)
Private
0.069
0.162
0.095
0.017
(0.030)
(0.078)
(0.046)
(0.009)
q: Public effect = 0
0.001
0.001
0.019
q: Private effect = 0
0.066
0.066
0.066
q: Public = private effect
0.047
0.047
0.345
Mean outcome
0.006
159.291
9.840
0.120
# observations
6609
6589
6574
6575
Coefficients are from regressing each outcome on a vector of treatment assignments and randomization block fixed effects.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors shown in parentheses, clustering by the 84 treatment dates. Sharpened q-values
control the false discovery rate across outcomes in each panel, following Benjamini et al. (2006). The first column of each
panel shows inverse covariance-weighted averages of outcomes in each panel, following Anderson (2008). The index is
omitted for the report use variables because these are zero for all control group candidates, so the covariance cannot be
estimated. Mean outcome is for the control group. All outcomes use a 7-day recall period unless marked with a (30-day
recall period) or b (since treatment). Outcomes marked with c use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. The sample
sizes differ across columns due to item non-response, mostly from respondents reporting that they don’t know the answer.
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E

Audit Study

We conduct an audit study to identify the effect of information provision on firm decisions, without
any scope for mediating behavior by workseekers. We submit real workseekers’ applications to
entry-level job vacancies and randomly vary the information firms see about workseekers’ skills.
This appendix reports more information about the process and sample to help interpret the results
reported in Section 4.3.
We implement the audit study in nine sequential rounds. In each round, we invite candidates
by text message to submit application materials to us, within 7 days, for an undisclosed job opportunity.31 We do not explicitly indicate our affiliations or link the message to Harambee. We send
one reminder text message to all candidates 1-3 days after the initial invitation.
We invite 2,220 candidates to send CVs over the nine rounds. We randomly sample candidates
from those who had already completed the workseeker survey. 717 candidates (28%) submit CVs
within the one week period. Most CVs include some information about proxies for candidates’ skills:
91% include a reference letter or contact information for referees and 55% include their secondary
school graduation results (Table E.1, panel A). The 717 responders are similar to the full workseeker
sample on all baseline covariates except gender, where deliberately oversampled men for an even
gender split. Candidates in the private treatment group are slightly more likely to respond to the
invitation (Panel B). All treatment effects are robust to reweighting the responders to have the
same distribution of treatment assignments and baseline covariates as the full workseeker sample.
For each application received, we record information on when the application was received,
where it was sent from, what documents are included, and an indicator for scan quality of included documents (e.g. photographs versus high-quality scans). We also send the candidate an
acknowledgement of receipt.
Simultaneously, we compile job vacancies from several online job posting sites. We selected only
vacancies suitable for entry-level workers, so that all candidates in our sample are eligible to apply.
We exclude jobs that look suspicious or are discriminatory, for example: jobs that ask for payments
of any kind to apply, promise unrealistic salaries or benefits, or discriminate based on appearance,
race, or gender. This generates a sample of 1,068 vacancies over the nine rounds, though we exclude
70 vacancies for reasons discussed below. 48% of the vacancies are for sales jobs, with the remaining
vacancies spread over clerical, call center, factory, restaurant and retail jobs.
We submit 4 applications to each vacancy, each “from” a different candidate using a different
email address. We do not represent ourselves as the candidate. Instead, we use a generic email
address designed to look like the application was scanned at a copy/printing shop, a generic subject
31

We send each individual a text message: “Dear <name>, we have identified a job opportunity for you. We are a
group of researchers trying to help young people find jobs. If you are interested, email your CV to <email address>
or fax your CV to <fax number>. Find more info at <website>. Please send your CV within 7 days.” A CV in
South Africa is generally understood to include all materials relevant to job applications.
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Table E.1: Comparison Between Audit and Workseeker Study Samples
Workseekers in audit sample
Mean Std Dev. Obs
Panel A: Characteristics of applications received from workseekers
Includes references or a reference letter
0.91
0.29
713
Includes a copy of ID document
0.47
0.50
714
Includes information about secondary school completion 0.55
0.50
714

-

-

-

Panel B: Characteristics of workseekers
Public treatment
Private treatment
Age
Male
University degree / diploma
Any other post-secondary qualification
Completed secondary education only
Numeracy assessment score (z-score)
Literacy/communications assessment score (z-score)
Concept formation assessment score (z-score)
Grit assessment score (z-score)
Worked in the last 7 days (endline)

0.33
0.31
23.6
0.38
0.17
0.21
0.61
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.03
0.38

0.47
0.46
3.30
0.49
0.37
0.41
0.49
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.48

6891
6891
6891
6891
6891
6891
6891
6891
6891
6891
6891
6891

0.30
0.37
23.2
0.48
0.18
0.24
0.58
0.06
0.02
0.11
0.10
0.40

0.46
0.48
3.12
0.50
0.38
0.42
0.49
0.96
0.94
0.93
0.99
0.49

717
717
717
717
717
717
717
717
717
717
717
717

All workseekers
Mean Std Dev. Obs

line, and generic email message.32 We send most applications within 2 weeks of compiling the
vacancy list.
We use a three-stage randomization process. First, we generate multiple applications per candidate and randomly assign half of these to treatment status and half to control status. Treatment
applications are sent with a public certificate and control applications without any certificate. In
all other respects, treatment and control applications are identical. This randomization is independent of workseekers’ treatment status in the workseekers’ study. This generates within- and
between-candidate variation in the information content of their applications. Second, we randomize
vacancies to receive either one or three applications with reports. This generates within-vacancy
variation in the information content of the applications received and between-vacancy variation in
the overall information environment. Third, we randomly match applications to vacancies, subject
to the target number of treated and control applications and the constraint that no candidate’s
application is sent to the same vacancy more than once. The realized distribution of treatment
assignments shown in Table E.2, Panel A matches the intended design: half of the applications are
sent with certificates and, mechanically, applications sent with reports are three times more likely
to be sent to vacancies that receive three applications with reports.
We monitor and record responses for two weeks after sending the applications. We classify each
response into one of these categories: (1) interview invitation, (2) request to send more information
or visit the establishment in person, (3) email bounce, (4) scam, and (5) other - mostly personalized
32
We cross-randomize the subject lines “Application for <vacancy>” and “Application for <candidate name>”
with the email messages “Please find attached the application for <vacancy> as recently advertised online” and
“Please find the application for <candidate name> for <vacancy>, as recently advertised online.”
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Table E.2: Descriptive Statistics for Application-Level Attributes
Mean Std Dev. # Obs
Panel A: Characteristics of applications submitted
Had one report in a vacancy with one report
0.12
0.33
3992
Had one report in a vacancy with three reports
0.38
0.48
3992
Had no report in a vacancy with one report
0.37
0.48
3992
Had no report in a vacancy with three reports
0.13
0.33
3992
Panel B: Responses to applications submitted
Any response received
Interview request received

0.15
0.09

0.35
0.29

3992
3992

acknowledgements of receipt. If any application sent to a vacancy receives a type (3) or (4) response,
we drop the vacancy from the sample. We define two outcome variables for analysis. First, any
application that receives a type (1) response is coded as an ‘interview invitation.’ Second, any
response that receives a type (1), (2), or (5) response is classified as ‘any response’. We forward all
responses to the relevant candidate so they can contact the firm.
The final sample consists of 3,992 applications sent to 998 vacancies, after dropping 70 vacancies
with bounce or scam responses. 15% of these applications receive any response, including 9% that
receive interview invitations (Table E.2, panel B).
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F

Placebo Certification Experiment: Sample Report and Treatment Effects

Figure F.1: Sample Placebo Certificate

REPORT ON ASSESSMENT PROCESS
name.. surname..
ID No. id..
This report provides information on assessments conducted by Harambee Youth Employment Accelerator
(harambee.co.za), a South African organisation that connects employers looking for entry-level talent to young, highpotential work-seekers with a matric or equivalent. Harambee has conducted more than 1 million assessments and placed
candidates with over 250 top companies in retail, hospitality, financial services and other sectors. Assessments are
designed by psychologists and predict candidates’ productivity and success in the workplace. This report was designed
and funded in collaboration with the World Bank. You can find more information about this report, the assessments and
contact details at www.assessmentreport.info. «name» was assessed at Harambee on «date».

«name» completed assessments on English Communication (listening, reading, comprehension), Numeracy, and Concept
Formation:
1. The Numeracy tests measure candidates’ ability to apply numerical concepts at a National Qualifications Framework
(NQF) level, such as working with fractions, ratios, money, percentages and units, and performing calculations with
time and area. This score is an average of two numeracy tests the candidate completed.
2. The Communication test measures a candidate's grasp of the English language through listening, reading and
comprehension. It assesses at an NQF level, for example measuring the ability to recognise and recall literal and non
literal text.
3. The Concept Formation Test is a nonverbal measure that evaluates candidates’ ability to understand and solve
problems. Those with high scores are generally able to solve complex problems, while lower scores indicate an ability
to solve less complex problems.

«name» also completed tasks and questionnaires to assess their soft skills:
4. The Planning Ability Test measures how candidates plan their actions in multi-step problems. Candidates with high
scores generally plan one or more steps ahead in solving complex problems.
5. The Focus Test assesses a candidate’s ability to distinguish relevant from irrelevant information in potentially
confusing environments. Candidates with high scores are generally able to focus on tasks in distracting surroundings,
while candidates with lower scores are more easily distracted by irrelevant information.
6. The Grit Scale measures whether candidates show determination when working on challenging problems. Those with
high scores generally spend more time working on challenging problems, while those with low scores choose to
pursue different problems.

DISCLAIMER: This is a confidential assessment report for use by the person specified above. The information in the report should
only be disclosed on a “need to know basis” with the prior understanding of the candidate. Harambee cannot accept responsibility for
decisions made based on the information contained in this report and cannot be held liable for the consequences of those decisions.

This figure shows an example of the certificates given to candidates in the placebo treatment group. The
certificates contain the candidate’s name and national identity number, and the logo of the World Bank and the
implementing agency. Each work seeker received 20 of these certificates, an email certificate, and guidelines on
how to request more certificates.
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Table F.1: Public and Placebo Certification Effects
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Hourly
Index Employed Hoursc Earningsc
wagec
Public
0.120
0.052
0.201
0.338
0.197
(0.027)
(0.012)
(0.052)
(0.074)
(0.040)
Placebo
0.027
0.020
0.039
0.069
0.054
(0.043)
(0.027)
(0.075)
(0.184)
(0.129)
p: public = placebo
0.041
0.245
0.045
0.147
0.266
Placebo / public ratio 0.222
0.379
0.196
0.204
0.275
# observations
6609
6607
6598
6589
6574
# clusters
84
84
84
84
84

(6)
Written
contract
0.020
(0.010)
0.005
(0.021)
0.471
0.238
6575
84

Coefficients are from regressing each outcome on a vector of treatment assignments, randomization block fixed
effects, and prespecified baseline covariates (measured skills, self-reported skills, education, age, gender, employment, discount rate, risk aversion). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors shown in parentheses, clustering
by treatment date. Mean outcome is for the control group. All outcomes use a 7-day recall period. Outcomes
marked with c use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. The index in the first column shows the inverse
covariance-weighted averages of the 5 labor market outcomes, following Anderson (2008). The mean ratio of
placebo to public effects is 0.258 for all 5 non-index outcomes. The sample sizes differ across columns due to
item non-response, mostly from respondents reporting that they don’t know the answer.
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G

Experiments with Firms: Willingness to Pay and Skill Ranking

This appendix provides more information about the firm-facing experiments described in Sections
5.1 and 5.2. We recruit a sample of 69 firms located in commercial areas near the low-income
residential areas in Johannesburg where most workseekers in our sample live. We survey them
about their hiring practices, measure their willingness-to-pay for a database containing information
about assessment results for workseekers in our sample, and measure their preferences for different
types of skills using an incentivized resume-ranking exercise.
Table G.1 reports summary statistics for this sample. Table G.2 shows summary statistics on
firms’ preferences for different types of skills. Figures G.1 and G.2 shows screenshots of the platform
marketed to firms. Figure G.3 shows the distribution of willingness-to-pay.
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Table G.1: Summary Statistics for Firm Sample
Variable
# obs Mean Std dev. 10th pctile
Wholesale & retail trade
69
0.623
0.488
Transport, storage & communication
69
0.014
0.120
Restaurant & hospitality
69
0.188
0.394
Agriculture
69
0.014
0.120
Financial & insurance
69
0.087
0.284
Community & social services
69
0.014
0.120
Hiring decisions made exclusively at
69
0.754
0.434
location interviewed
Uses external recruiting services
69
0.25
0.43
# employees
69
15.0
29.6
3.0
# entry-level employees
67
7.24
14.94
0.00
# vacancies for entry-level employees
59
1.42
3.70
0.00
# entry-level hires expected in
58
3.95
5.43
0.00
next 12 months
# applications received for last
56
16.2
21.2
2.0
entry-level vacancy posted
# weeks required to fill last
58
4.17
6.47
1.00
entry-level vacancy posted
Mean monthly compensation for
58
8,447
16,273
2,500
employees in last financial year
Total payroll costs in last
31
1.277
2.766
0.078
financial year (millions)

90th pctile

32.0
14.00
4.00
10.00
30.0
8.00
9,000
3.200

Table shows summary statistics for selected firm attributes variables. Percentiles are omitted for binary variables.
First six rows are indicators for sectors. All monetary figures are reported in South Africa Rands. 1 Rand ≈
USD 0.167 in purchasing power parity terms. # observations varies due to item non-response. Missing values
for the final variables are more common because the survey was completed by the person responsible for hiring
decisions, who did not always have access to financial records.

Table G.2: Firm Ranking of Profiles with Different Assessment Results and Education
(1)
(2)
(3)
Profile content
Share of firms ranking profile: Median
Top tercile
Highest education
aaaa First
Last
ranking
Communication
Complete secondary school
aaaa 0.119
0.015
3
Concept formation Complete secondary school
aaaa 0.075
0.030
4
Focus
Complete secondary school
aaaa 0.328
0.060
3
Grit
Complete secondary school
aaaa 0.134
0.045
4
Numeracy
Complete secondary school
aaaa 0.060
0.090
2
Planning
Complete secondary school
aaaa 0.194
0.000
4
None
One-year post-secondary diploma aaaa 0.090
0.761
7
Table shows summary statistics from firms’ ranking of profiles with different skill assessment results and different
level of education. All profiles have middle terciles for skills except that listed in the first column.

63

Figure G.1: Screenshots of Login Page and Filtering Page
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Figure G.2: Screenshot of Individual Candidate Profile on Platform
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Figure G.3: Willingness-to-pay for Database of Workseekers’ Assessment Results
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Notes: This figure shows the distribution of willingness-to-pay for access to the database of assessment results
described in Section 5.1 and shown in Figures G.1 and G.2. Values are in South African Rands, with 1 Rand ≈
USD 0.167 in purchasing power parity terms. The maximum possible bid is 10,000 South African Rands.
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